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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the possible future prospects for the solution of the
Cyprus question, by mainly focusing on the two state systems, namely confederation
and federation. The Cyprus question, which has endured for more than 40 years, has
occupied a significant place in the foreign policies of the two motherlands, namely
Greece and Turkey, as well as the international actors, namely the USA particularly
and the EU recently. The involvement of those actors, which have different political,
economic or military expectations over the issue, has not only complicated the
problem but also led to the unsettlement of the dispute. Under those circumstances,
the question is which political system could merge the two communities as well as
prepare the ground for an extensive cooperation among them. This study defines and
compares these two state systems, and analyses them whether they are applicable or
not in the case of Cyprus. This thesis argues that there exist two sovereign and equal
peoples having equal rights of self-determination in Cyprus. These two communities
are clearly divided into two in terms of culture, religion, language and origin that no
one can talk about a separate Cypriot Nation. Moreover, the thirty-seven year-old
partition has left the two communities with limited contact and communication
which nourished the feeling of fear and distrust with each other. Therefore, it may
produce dangerous results to force these two peoples to live under one roof, where
there exists a history of conflict as well as a serious confidence crisis in their
relations with each other. Under such circumstances, confederal settlement seems the
viable solution to provide the needs of the peoples of Cyprus.
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ÖZET
Bu çalışma Kıbrıs probleminin gelecekteki olası çözüm umutlarını, iki
yönetim sistemi olan konfederasyon ve federasyon üzerine yoğunlaşarak
incelemektedir. Kırk yılı aşkın bir zamandır süregelen Kıbrıs Problemi ana devletler
olan Yunanistan ve Türkiye kadar uluslararası aktörlerin, özellikle Amerika ve son
zamanlarda Avrupa Birliği'nin dış politikalarında önemli bir yer kaplamaktadır.
Kıbrıs'la ilgili değişik politik, ekonomik ve askeri beklentileri olan bu aktörlerin
katılımı bu problemi sadece karmaşık hale getirmemiş, aynı zamanda konuyu
çözümsüz kılmıştır. Bu şartlar altında konu iki toplumu hangi politik sistemle
birleştirebilmek olduğu kadar aralarında geniş ölçüde bir işbirliği sağlamak için
uygun zemini de hazırlayabilmektir. Bu çalışma bu iki yönetim sistemini
tanımlamakta ve karşılaştırmakta olup, bu sistemlerin Kıbrıs'a uygulanabilirliliğini
analiz etmektedir. Bu tez Kıbrıs'ta kendi kaderini kendisinin tayin etme hakkına
sahip iki eşit, egemen toplumun bulunduğunu savunmaktadır. Kültür, din, dil, ve
köken açısından açık bir şekilde ikiye bölünmüş olan bu iki toplum için ayrı bir
"Kıbrıs Ulusundan" bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Otuzyedi yıllık bölünme
sonucunda iki toplum arasındaki iletişim azlığı, birbirlerine karşı olan korku ve
güvensizlik duygularını beslemiştir. Bu sebeple, karşılıklı ilişkilerinde tarihe dayalı
çatışmalar ve ciddi bir güven krizinin bulunduğu bu iki toplumu tek bir çatı altında
yaşamaya zorlamak tehlikeli sonuçlar doğurabilir. Bu şartlar altında, konfederal bir
yapı Kıbrıs halklarının ihtiyaçlarını karşılayabilecek, uygulanabilir bir çözüm olarak
görünmektedir.
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1INTRODUCTION
The Cyprus dispute is one of the international and inter-communal conflicts,
which for more than 40 years has occupied a significant place in the foreign policies
of the two motherlands of the island's communities, namely Greece and Turkey, as
well as in international politics. Over the years, many steps have been taken to find a
solution to the problem especially under UN auspices, however no settlement could
be achieved so far, since both Greece and Turkey avoided any derogation from their
official positions on this particular question. In the case of Cyprus, there are so many
parties to the problem involving the two communities' motherlands, namely Greece
and Turkey, the EU, the United States as well as the two communities of the island.
Therefore, their "multi-faceted" interests are the main determinants behind the lack
of agreement, since those parties have different expectations over the issue.
History plays a significant role in the unsettlement of the Cyprus problem and
each community has its version of history which, in fact, does not reflect the entire
truth.   The increasing feeling of insecurity among the members of two communities
against each other as well as the feeling of distrust obstruct cooperation and prevent
the evolution of a common understanding.
Since 1975, the Secretaries-General of the UN under the mission of good-
offices is trying not only to bring the two communities of Cyprus together but also to
prepare the ground for an extensive cooperation among them. However, the
negotiation and the mediation attempts of the UN could not address the expectations
of the both sides so far.
This thesis aims to put forward the future prospects for the settlement of the
Cyprus problem by mainly focusing on the two state systems, namely confederation
2and federation. It is based on the views and existing positions of the main parties,
particularly the two communities of the island by analysing whether a confederal or a
federal settlement would provide the needs of the peoples of Cyprus.
The thesis consists of four chapters:
The first chapter mainly focuses on the historical background of the Cyprus
problem by highlighting the developments that took place from 1950s to 1990s,
including the UN initiatives aiming at contributing to an overall settlement in
Cyprus. Furthermore, it focuses on the recent UN-sponsored proximity talks, which
took place recently under the mission of good-offices of the UN Secretary-General,
Kofi Annan.
The second chapter mainly focuses on the two communities' views and
existing positions, namely a two-state confederation proposed by the Turkish Cypriot
side; and the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation formula approved by the Greek
Cypriot side. It defines and compares these two state systems in details.
The third chapter focuses on the views and existing positions of the
international actors, namely the United States, the European Union, Greece and
Turkey concerning Cyprus. It also analyses their (past and present) policies when
Cyprus is concerned.
In the last chapter, future prospects for the Cyprus question is discussed. It
analyses the success of a federal system in the case of Cyprus as well as asks the
question of whether a confederal settlement is a viable solution for Cyprus. It also
addresses the main challenges to be faced in the search for a solution to Cyprus.
3CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM
Cyprus is an eastern Mediterranean island1, which plays an important role
both in the internal and international affairs of the two countries, namely Greece and
Turkey. Due to its significant geo-political location2, it was invaded and ruled by
many civilisations such as Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Romans,
Byzantines, Lusignans and Venetians, respectively3.
The island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, and it remained
under its administration for more than 300 years. In 1878, within the framework of a
defence alliance concluded between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, Britain was
given the administration of the island in return for its support of Ottoman integrity
against the ambitions of Russia. Cyprus remained under the nominal sovereignty of
the Ottomans until 1914, when it was formally annexed by Britain due to the
involvement of the Ottomans into the World War I (WWI) on the side of the Central
                                                          
1 After Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, with an area of
3,572 square miles. It is 40 miles away from the south of Turkey and 600 miles from the south-east of
Greece, and has a population of approximately 750,000. According to the US State Department
figures, the ethnic composition of Cyprus consists of: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians,
Manorites and Latin Cypriots.
2 For details about the significance of Cyprus' geo-political location see Michael Stephen, "Cyprus and
the Rule of Law," Perceptions 4, no.3 (September-November 1999): 78-80.
3 For details about the ancient history of Cyprus see John Munro and Zahi Khuri, Cyprus: Between
Venus and Mars (Delmar: Caravan Books, 1984), 13-95.
4Powers. The sovereignty of the island was transferred by Turkey to Britain in 1923
by the Treaty of Lausanne, and the island was given the status of a "British crown
colony" in 19254.
During the period till 1950s, the agitation attempts of the Greek Cypriot side
against the British population as well as the Turkish Cypriots continued. One of the
most significant agitation attempts conducted by the Greek Cypriots was the 1930
Uprising. This crisis emanated from the order, which enforced tax increases against
the rejection by the elected representatives.
1.1 Historical Causes of the Cyprus Dispute5
From the very beginning, Greece's Cyprus policy can be explained only by
enosis6, which is part of the Megali Idea7. Enosis is the primary reason behind the
emergence of the Cyprus Dispute between Greece and Turkey as well as between the
communities of the island. "Some Greek writers admit that the Cyprus problem is
intimately connected with Greek expansionism, inspired by the Megali Idea…which
has its origin in the conquest of Constantinople…, the capital of the Byzantine
Empire, by the Ottoman Turks in May 1453"8. They mainly aim at extending the
boundaries of the Greek State to include all historically Greek lands. In the words of
Zenon Stavrinides:
                                                          
4 For British connection see John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection (Nicosia:
K. Rustem and Brother, 1986), 3-29.
5 For details see Salahi Sonyel, "Historical Causes of the Cyprus Problem," First International
Congress on Cypriot Studies, Emel Dogramacı, William Haney and Güray König (editors)
(Gazimagusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, November 1996): 33-45.
6 Enosis means "Union", the union of Cyprus with Greece. "For the Greek Orthodox Church, enosis
means the 'restoration of the Empire of Byzantium' which includes Cyprus". Within the framework of
Megali Idea, Cyprus constitutes Megali Nisi, which means the Great Island. For details see Osman
Orek, Cyprus Problem: Why no solution (Lefkoşa: Public Relations Department of the TRNC MFA
and Defence, 1997), 3-4.
7 The Great Ideal of the Greeks, which aims at recreating the Byzantium Empire.
8 For details see Salahi Sonyel, "Historical Causes of the Cyprus Problem", 33.
5Growing national pride and self-confidence took the form of 'the
Great Idea', i.e. a belief in the necessity of building up a Greater
Greek State 'of the two continents and the five seas', to cover all the
Greek speaking, Christian Orthodox part of the old Byzantine
Empire, which was still under the domination of 'the ancestral
enemy', the Turks9.
The dream of enosis could also be seen in the speeches of Makarios10, one of
them, which took place on 20 October 1950, he said, "I take the holly oath that I shall
work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of
annexing Cyprus with Mother Greece"11.
The Greek Orthodox Church had played and is playing the leading role in
shaping Greek and Greek Cypriot policies, and in the island it played an active role
in provocating the nationalist feelings of the Greek Cypriot population. It began to
agitate the Greek Cypriots for union with the motherland Greece in 1821, with the
start of rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. However, all its preparations for a
rebellion against the Turkish rule were put down by the Ottoman Empire. The Greek
Cypriots rebelled against the British administration and claimed enosis for many
times between 1878 and 1960. During this period, they insisted on enosis, whereas
the Turkish Cypriots were highly opposed to such an idea; and "the British
government playing the one community against the other for its own interests"12.
The conflict between the two communities arose from the fact that the Greek
Cypriots believed that they had the right to determine the political future of the
whole of the island and they desired to be united with Greece. Whereas the Turks
believed that each side had separate rights to determine the political status of the
                                                          
9 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood (Loris Stavrinides Press,
1976), 18.
10 Makarios was the leader of the Greek Cypriots.
11 see Osman Orek, Cyprus Problem: Why no solution , 21.
12 see Salahi Sonyel, "Historical Causes of the Cyprus Problem," 42.
6island13. "To the Greek Cypriots, enosis was what they referred to as 'liberation and
freedom'; to the Turkish Cypriots, such a union was colonisation, loss of all human
rights, and physical elimination from Cyprus"14.
1.2 Internationalisation of the Cyprus Problem
The roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to 1950s, and until 1954,
Cyprus remained as an internal problem of the concerned parties. However, as of
1954, the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis, directed by Archbishop Makarios,
emerged with new force since Greece attempted to bring the issue to the United
Nations (UN) to win international recognition and support for the cause of enosis.
Greece had sponsored draft resolutions calling for international support of Cypriot
self-determination. They claimed that since the majority in the island was of Greek
origin, the right to self-determination should belong to the Greeks, and this right
should be applied to the island as a whole, not separately to both communities. The
main objective of Greece in taking the issue to the UN was to achieve enosis under
the name of self-determination15.
On the contrary, the Turkish side claimed that there existed two separate
communities in the island that it could not be possible to talk about a Cypriot Nation.
Therefore, if the right to self-determination was applied, then it should be applied
separately to both communities. The two communities are completely different from
each other, that they have nothing in common, like language, culture, national origin
                                                          
13 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood (Loris Stavrinides Press,
1976), 100.
14 see Salahi Sonyel, "Historical Causes of the Cyprus Problem," 37.
15 The Greek Cypriot leadership believed that there was a Cypriot Nation made up only of the Greeks
where the Turks were simply a minority in that Greek Cypriot nation. Therefore, the will of the
minority should not prevail against the will of the majority. They claimed this by ignoring the reality
that Cyprus is a two-community island, composed of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.
For details about Greece's attempts in the UN see Aydın Olgun, Kıbrıs Gercegi: 1930-1990 (Ankara:
Demircioglu Matbaacılık, 1991), 10-13.
7or even religion. There had never been a Cypriot Nation on the island as Makarios
himself admitted in 1963 that "the Cyprus agreements (of 1959) have created a state,
but not a nation"16.
For many times during 1950s, Greek Government appealed to the UN for
equal rights and self-determination for Cyprus17; however,"….the UN General
Assembly did not uphold Greek demands designed to achieve annexation under the
guise of self-determination, but urged negotiations among the parties concerned"18.
Since they failed to gain the right to self-determination in the UN, they tried to
achieve enosis by force of arms.
 In 1955, the underground organisation, EOKA19, was formed by the
initiatives of the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios and Colonel George Grivas20. They
arranged secret shipments of arms from Greece to Cyprus to launch terrorist
activities against the British population as well as the Turkish Cypriot community. In
the words of Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, "EOKA received direct
support from Greece in money, arms, organisation and propaganda"21. The climbing
terrorist activities of EOKA turned towards the Turkish Cypriots in the island
towards the end of 1950s, which also increasingly created civil strife and mistrust
between the two communities. The situation got worse and worse; and the inter-
communal fighting intensified all over the island.
                                                          
16 "Turkish interest and the first debate in the UN", http://www.trncwashdc.org/h7.html
17 see Suha Bolukbası, The Superpower and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus
(Virginia: University Press of America, 1988), 26-28.
18 "Information Note on the Cyprus Issue", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/note.htm, Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkish MFA).
19 EOKA stands for "Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston"= National Organisation of Cypriot
Fighters
20 He was the military leader of enosis. For details see Osman Orek, Cyprus Problem: Why no
solution , 12-16.
21 "Terrorism started", http://www.trncwashdc.org/h7.html
8In 1957, with the Suez Canal Crisis, "the British government accepted that
'bases in Cyprus' were an acceptable alternative to 'Cyprus as a base'22, which led
Britain to produce a much more flexible approach to the problem. In addition to this,
another important development took place in the late 1950s that the world was
undergoing rapid change and the decolonisation period started. Therefore, the
colonies were becoming independent one after another. In those circumstances,
Britain expressed its readiness to transfer sovereignty jointly to the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot people for the creation of an independent state in Cyprus on the
condition of retaining its sovereign bases23 in the island.
By the end of 1958, Greece and the Greek Cypriot side realised that they
could not achieve their aspirations over Cyprus, since both Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots were highly opposed to the idea of enosis. Furthermore, Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots declared their desire on the partition (taksim) of the island between
the two communities. Therefore, in order to do with the idea of partition, the Greek
Cypriots appeared as if they agreed on the international agreements of Zurich and
London in 1959 and the Establishment Treaty of 1960. They had to agree on the
1960 settlement, since "practical realities, however (e.g foreign pressures), have
rendered enosis 'not feasible' at present, and the setting up of an independent republic
was the second best settlement. It should not be forgotten that Turkey had been
striving to partition the island - and that would mean the permanent impossibility of
enosis"24.
                                                          
22 "British Rule in Cyprus: 1878-1960" http://www.cypnet.com/.ncyprus/cyp3.html
23 The names of these two sovereign base areas are Dhekelia and Akrotiri. For details about these
bases see Ahmet Gazioglu, Two Equal and Sovereign Peoples (Lefkoşa: Cyrep, 1997), 91-123.
24 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood , 41.
91.3 The 1960 Cyprus Settlement
The British colonial administration continued until 1960 when a bi-communal
state, the Republic of Cyprus, was founded under international treaties25 concluded
by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and by the leaders of both communities,
namely the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. As established in 1960, the
Republic of Cyprus was not a unitary state but a political partnership based on the
political and sovereign equality of the both communities. Under the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee and of Alliance, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey became the
guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus to prevent either side from imposing its
political will over the other. Since the structure was based on equal partnership, and
since the population majority was in favour of Greek Cypriots, the President of the
Republic would be a Greek, whereas the Vice-President would be a Turkish Cypriot
who would have a veto power26.
1.4 The Breakdown of the 1960 Order
This structure, which was based on the equal partnership of the both
communities, did not satisfy the expectations of the Greek Community, and it
became clear that the Greek Cypriots did not have any intention to abide by the 1960
Constitution. From the very first day of the 1960 Settlement, the Greek Cypriot side
attempted to destroy internal as well as external balances, since they regarded the
establishment of this equal partnership as a temporary impediment in achieving their
ultimate goal of enosis. This intention was clearly stated by Makarios, the leader of
                                                          
25 The 1960 Settlement came into being by, first, the Zurich and London agreements of 1959; and
then, the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee and of Alliance of 1960. For the text of
these documents see Appendices A and B respectively.
26 For details about the governmental structure of "the Republic of Cyprus" see Christian Heinze,
Cyprus Conflict (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1986), 1-35.
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the Greek Cypriots, on 28 July 1960, that "agreements do not form the goal - they are
the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national
cause and shape their future in accordance with THEIR will"27. Therefore, the 1960
settlement went ahead only three years and in November 1963, the Greek Cypriots
started their campaign by demanding the abolition of the basic principles of the
Constitution28, which had been included in the 1960 Agreement for the protection of
the Turkish Cypriots. The Akritas Plan29 was put into effect to create a fait accompli,
which would not only aim to annihilate the Turkish Cypriots, but also the annexation
of the whole island to the motherland Greece. Turkish Cypriots were expelled from
all the government organs by force of arms and the state machinery was completely
usurped by the Greek Cypriots. "Makarios' aim was to convert the partnership
Republic into a Greek Cypriot republic"30. At Christmas 196331, the Greek Cypriot
militia attacked the Turkish Cypriot people that so many of them were killed during
this attack. The entire world, including the UN, merely watched all these inhuman
actions and did not attempt to take any measures to prevent the massacre of the
Turkish Cypriots. They failed even to condemn the ongoing events throughout the
island against the Turkish Cypriot community. Instead, the UN rewarded them by
treating the Greek Cypriot administration as if it was the legitimate Government of
whole of Cyprus, which can be seen in the Security Council Resolution 18632 dated
                                                          
27 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/briefing.htm, Turkish MFA
28 Makarios submitted his 13 points of amendment in the 1960 Constitution mainly aiming to reduce
or completely remove the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot people. Those amendments
which would have been aimed to be put into the effect by Makarios would imply to abolish the rights
of the Turkish Cypriots and at the same time aimed to create a unitary state dominated by the Greeks;
and to give a minority status to the Turkish Cypriot community.
29 Akritas Plan was put into action in 1963 to achieve enosis. For details see Rauf Denktaş, Akritas
Planı ve Gençliğe Sesleniş (Yorum Yayınları, 1994). See Appendix C for the text of the Akritas Plan.
30 Rauf Denktaş, "The Crux of the Cyprus Problem", Perceptions 4, no.3 (Sep-Nov 1999): 8.
31 The Greek Cypriots tried to convince the world that these massacres never happened in Cyprus.
However, the evidence is set out in great detail by Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files (London:
Charles Bravos Publishers, 1997).
32 see Appendix D for the text of the Security Council Resolution 186.
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1964. With the same resolution, the Security Council also recommended the
establishment of an international peacekeeping force, that is UNFICYP33, to prevent
the recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of order and to return
to the normal conditions. Furthermore, a cease-fire line was drawn across the island
by UNFICYP with the consent of both sides.
During the 1963-1974 period, there took place many attempts directed by the
Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot community, to eliminate them through
ethnic cleansing. Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were killed or subjected to atrocities
by the Greek Cypriot militia or subjected to disappearance. The remaining part of the
Turkish Cypriot population had become refugees in their own land and forced to
withdraw into small enclaves, which corresponded to only three per cent of the
whole territory of Cyprus34. During this period, Greek and Turkish representatives
held a series of UN sponsored talks aiming at finding a framework for the
normalisation of the relations between the two communities. However, no progress
could be achieved.
1.5 The Events of 1974
On 15 July 1974, a successful coup d'etat, which was organised by the Greek
military junta, took place in the island against Makarios. This created deep concern
and worry on the part of the Turkish government in Turkey, and therefore the Ankara
government called the British government to take all the necessary measures in
enforcing the Treaty of Guarantee. However, Britain declined to participate in a joint
                                                          
33 The UN Security Council resolution 186 ordered the establishment of an international peace-
keeping force in Cyprus, that is UNFICYP, to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to contribute to
the maintenance of order and to return to the normal conditions. The UN troops were first sent to the
island in March 1964 having a six- month mandate. However, this mandate has been renewed on the
same basis ever since.
34 Rauf Denktas, "The Crux of the Cyprus Problem," 14.
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action in accordance with the Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee35 to protect the
independence of the island and to re-establish the state of affairs. Under these
circumstances, on 20 July 1974, Turkey intervened to the events on the island using
its treaty rights and obligations as a guarantor power, which was granted by the
Article IV of the Guarantee Treaty of 196036, to protect the lives of the Turkish
community, and prevent takeover of the island by Greece37.
This was the first phase of the Turkish intervention and after this, an
international conference was held in Geneva38 between Greece, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, which was a total failure. The First Peace Operation and the
following cease-fire did not bring the required security to the Turks of the island.
Turkish Cypriots outside the areas held by the Turkish army were in imminent
danger of annihilation. Therefore, the second phase of the Turkish intervention
started on 14 August and lasted on 16 August 197439.
In 1975, negotiations between the two parties began under the UN auspices in
Vienna. However, the talks quickly broke down, since there appeared a serious
disagreement between the two sides. "It became clear that the Turkish Cypriots
wanted a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in which major powers would not be
located at the federal central"40, whereas the Greek Cypriot regime was highly
opposed to such a settlement that they continued rejecting the political equality of
Turkish Cypriots. Since no progress could be achieved, the Turkish Federated State
                                                          
35 For Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee see Appendix B.
36 For Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee see Appendix B.
37 For details about Turkey's intervention in Cyprus see Erol Mutercimler, Kıbrıs Barıs Harekatının
Bilinmeyen Yonleri (Istanbul: Yaprak Yayınevi, 1990), 143-303.
38 ibid., 305-327.
39 Although the Turkish intervention to the events on the island was labelled as "occupation" by
Greece and the Greek Cypriot community, Turkey completely used its treaty rights and obligations to
stop the inhuman activities of the Greeks. Otherwise, the ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Cypriots
would have been completed in the island, and only after the Turkish intervention, Greek Cypriot
violence could be brought to an end.
40 Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Huntingdon: the Eothen Press, 1998), 34.
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of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed by the Turkish Cypriot side on 13 February 1975,
aimed at contributing towards a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal solution.
1.6 UN Initiatives
Since 1975, the Secretaries-General of the UN under the mission of good
offices is trying to bring the two sides together and facilitating their negotiations on
an equal footing41. Under the auspices of successive UN Secretaries-General, "a
number of parameters such as political equality, bi-zonality, bi-communality,
property exchange, the continuation of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance and
the tackling of EU membership after a settlement emerged as a framework for
solution"42.
There took place many inter-communal talks between the two parties during
this period, and the 1977 and 1979 High-level agreements between the two sides in
Cyprus set the guidelines for future negotiations. It is formulated the establishment of
a new partnership in the form of a bi-communal and bi-zonal independent federal
republic based on the political equality of the two communities. However, the
negotiation and the mediation attempts of the UN in the following years could not
address the expectations of the both sides. No settlement could be achieved so far,
since the Turkish Cypriot side insisted on the settlement, which should base on the
equality of the two communities, whereas Greek Cypriots insisted on the
implementation of three freedoms, namely the freedom of movement, the freedom of
settlement and the right to own property43.
                                                          
41 see Suha Bolukbasi, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement
between 1954 and 1996," Middle Eastern Studies 30 (1998): 411-434.
42 "How did the Situation Change After July 1974?", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh07/05.htm
43 "Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations", http://www.fas.org/man/crs/89-140.htm
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From 1980 to 1983, another series of inter-communal talks resumed under the
auspices of the UN. "These talks were characterised by in-depth discussions of all
aspects of the Cyprus question"44. Again this proposal was not welcomed by the
Greek Cypriot side, since they were pursuing a policy of internationalisation of the
issue, which eventually paralysed the inter-communal talks.
Neither side had the right to rule the other nor have the right to be the
government of the other. However, in the international arena the de facto Greek
Cypriot Administration was continued to be treated as if it were the continuation of
the Republic of Cyprus. On 13 May 1983, the UN General Assembly passed
Resolution 37/25345, which "once again denied the Turkish Cypriot side the right to
be heard"46. Therefore, under those circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot side had no
alternative, but to set up their own administration, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC)47, in 1983. "Following a process of political and administrative
evolution, the Turkish Cypriot people established the TRNC in pursuance of their
right to self-determination"48. The reason behind this declaration was to get
recognition in order to represent itself in the international platforms.
The UN reacted to this proclamation by adopting its resolution of 541; and
then resolution 55049. By those resolutions, UN described the attempt to create
TRNC as "legally invalid" and called for the withdrawal of the Declaration of
Independence; and again called the parties not to recognise this new state. Today,
                                                          
44 see Necati Munir Ertekun, "The Recent History of the Cyprus Question since Independence in
1960," First International Congress on Cypriot Studies, Emel Dogramacı, William Haney and Güray
König (editors) (Gazimagusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, November 1996): 57.
45 see Appendix E for the text of the UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253.
46 see Necati Munir Ertekun, "The Recent History of the Cyprus Question since Independence in
1960," 57.
47 TRNC is recognised as a state only by Turkey. For more details about TRNC see Dieter
Blumenwitz, "Cyprus: Political and Legal Realities," Perceptions 4, no.3 (September-November
1999): 67-77.
48 ibid., 71.
49 For the text of those resolutions - 541 and 550 - see Appendices F and G respectively.
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there are two states on the island, one is internationally recognised and used the title
of "the Republic of Cyprus", whereas the other, TRNC, is recognised only by
Turkey.
Throughout years, new negotiation processes were initiated by the UN
Secretaries-General to find a reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the
Cyprus Problem. However, all these efforts were completely resulted in failure,
which deepened mistrust and lack of confidence between the two parties.
In 1990, the relationship between the two communities of Cyprus was
explained, not one of a majority or minority, but one of equal partnership by the
Secretary-General of the UN, and this view was also confirmed by the UN Security
Council Resolution 64950, adopted on 12 March 1990. It was one of the most
important resolutions, which has ever adopted about Cyprus that it, for the first time,
clearly indicated that the two communities of the island would be treated on an equal
footing.
1.6.1 Set of Ideas
In June 1992, the Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, invited the
leaders of the two communities to discuss a new UN initiative, called the Set of
Ideas51, for an overall framework agreement on Cyprus under the mission of good-
offices. During this period of proximity talks the UN Secretary-General and his
representatives had a number of separate meetings with the two leaders, which
focused on the eight headings of the Secretary-General's Set of Ideas. At the talks,
Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it "basically agreed" with 91 out of the 100
                                                          
50 see Appendix H for the text of the Security Council Resolution 649.
51 For details about the Set of Ideas process see the article of Suha Bolukbasi, "Boutros-Ghali's Cyprus
Initiative in 1992: Why Did it Fail?," Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 3 (July 1995): 471. For the text
of the Set of Ideas see Appendix I.
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paragraphs of the Set of Ideas. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side accepted
the Set of Ideas "only in principle, objecting to parts that [they] believed might
enable the Turkish Cypriots to block the admission to the EC, those on Greek
Cypriot refugees' right to return and property, and others on the status of the
Republic during the transition period"52. The Secretary-General observed that there is
a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides, and as long as this situation
continues, it could not be possible to have a successful outcome. However, "[b]asic
difference between the positions of the two sides could not be bridged and the talks
were adjourned to be resumed in early March 1993, after the presidential elections in
South Cyprus"53.
1.6.2 Confidence Building Measures
In the first half of 1993, following the presidential elections held in South
Cyprus, the UN Secretary-General urged the leaders of the two communities to
resume negotiations on the basis of Set of Ideas. Therefore, a package of Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) 54 was introduced for the two communities, which came
into being under the good-offices mission of the UN Secretary-General. The main
objective behind this initiative was to remove the deep crisis of confidence between
the two sides before an overall settlement.
On the Turkish side, Denktash insisted on the formal lifting of the economic
embargo, which was imposed by the Greek Cypriot side, as a pre-condition; whereas
on the Greek side, Mr. Clerides, was afraid that acceptance of the package would
                                                          
52 "Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations", http://www.fas.org/man/crs/89-140.htm
53 "Set of Ideas (1992)", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/f616.htm, Turkish MFA
54 CBMs included" a reduction of Turkish troops in exchange for a reduction in defence spending by
the Republic of Cyprus; opening of Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots;
reduced restrictions on foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bi-communal projects; a UN
supervised island-wide census; cooperation in UN feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments; re-opening of Nicosia Airport.
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mean recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. At the beginning of the talks, although
Denktash declared that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish
Cypriots and declared his reluctance over this proposal, later, with the great efforts of
the UN Secretary-General, he agreed on CBMs, in principle, on 28 January 199455.
Although the Turkish side declared its readiness to implement this package and its
willingness to discuss matters in order to settle the dispute in 1994, the Greek
Cypriot side has rejected the implementation of the measures.
Despite the failure of the CBMs, President Denktash took the initiative to
launch another peace process to create a new atmosphere of trust and to reach an
overall agreement on 20 January 1995. The Turkish Cypriot side expressed its
readiness to implement the CBMs and then to start negotiations without
preconditions towards a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal settlement. However, they
were all rejected by the Greek Cypriot side again.
1.7 Recent Developments
1.7.1 Growing Military Build-ups in the island
The armament program, which has been conducted by the Greek Cypriot side
within the framework of the so-called Joint Military Doctrine, reached its peak in
1996. They are spending huge amounts of money on armaments above their military
needs, and they heavily armed the southern part of the island. Despite all the
warnings of many countries and international organisations, mainly Turkey and UN,
they insisted on signing the contract to purchase S-300 anti-aircraft missile system
from the Russian Federation. Turkey was highly opposed to such deployments of this
missile systems, since its range covers not only the air space above the northern part
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of the island, but could reach Turkey's coastal air bases. "The Greeks…would seize
on any opportunity to make the whole of Cyprus a place of arms against Turkey"56.
In addition to the sophisticated weaponry, the opening of the military air base in
Paphos and a naval base within the framework of this so-called Military Doctrine
will add new and dangerous dimensions to the Cyprus issue by changing the military
balance in the region between the two motherlands. Furthermore, the Greek side is
openly supporting PKK terrorism against Turkey. These were the developments that
have complicated the prospects for a reasonable settlement of the Cyprus Dispute, as
well as escalate tension in the region. The growing military build-up in the island
may promote at increasing tension between the two motherlands, instead of
contributing to a reasonable settlement.
1.7.2 Troutbeck - First Round of Proximity Talks
Another rounds of talks between the two sides were held under the UN
auspices in 1997, first in Troutbeck, New York; and later in Glion, Switzerland. In
the July 1997 talks in Troutbeck, the differences between the two sides could not be
bridged, since the Greek Cypriots rejected the principle that sovereignty in the
proposed federation "emanated equally from both sides", as described in the first
Draft Joint Statement advanced by the UN Secretary-General. The Greek Cypriot
opposition emanated from their view of "single sovereignty" for Cyprus.
Furthermore, they wanted to discuss the "three freedoms" (freedom of movement,
freedom of settlement and the right to own property), the removal of Turkish troops
and the return of Turkish immigrants to the mainland instead of concentrating on
constitutional matters. The talks were concluded without having any achievement
since the Turkish Cypriot side learned that EU accession negotiations were going to
                                                          
56 Michael Stephen, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," 80.
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commence between EU and the Greek Cypriot leadership, whether there was a
settlement or not. After the talks, Rauf Denktash declared the recognition of the
Turkish Cypriot sovereignty as a starting point for future talks between the two
parties. He also pointed out that if accession negotiations with the South proceeded,
the integration process with Turkey would be started 57.
On 4 July 1997, a new Joint Declaration between Turkey and TRNC took
place to express both sides' desire to act jointly in the areas of economy, finance,
defence and foreign affairs. In addition, economic coordination between the two
parties would be developed to mitigate the effects of Greek embargoes. In the area of
defence, it was declared that any attack against TRNC would be considered as an
attack on Turkey58.
1.7.3 Glion - Second Round of Proximity Talks
Turkish Cypriot side together with the Greek Cypriot side attended the talks
held in Glion on 11 August 1997. A second Draft Joint Declaration was produced by
the UN, in which the expression of "sovereignty emanates equally from both
communities were modified; and sovereignty was described as "indivisible".
Furthermore, with this document it was stressed that "the Federal Republic to be
established should adhere strictly to international instruments regarding human
rights, thus implying that the Turkish Cypriot refusal to allow Greek Cypriot
refugees of 1974 to return to their former properties was an infringement of their
rights"59. This document was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side since they believed
that it completely denied the sovereignty of each community.
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1.7.4 A New Phase in the Cyprus Issue: Luxembourg Summit of 1997
The enlargement process of the EU began with the Luxembourg Summit of
December 1997, and the Greek part of Cyprus was included within this process60.
Following the decisions taken in the European Council held in Luxembourg in 1997,
the EU started formal accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus on March
31, 1998.
1.7.5 A New Proposal: Confederation
On 31 August 1998, the Turkish Cypriot side came with a confederation
proposal61, "which addresses all the legitimate concerns of the parties, including the
status of the two sides and the Turkish-Greek balance over Cyprus. It also provides
that a policy of accession can be pursued by the joint agreement of the two parties if
Turkey is accorded the rights of an EU member with regard to Cyprus. The Greek
Cypriot side has so far declined to negotiate on this basis"62.
1.7.6 The G-8 Initiation:
The G-8 Summit of June 1999 refers to the Cyprus issue, and with its joint
declaration, it invited the UN Secretary-General to convene the parties to begin a
"process of substantive negotiations, without preconditions and a spirit of
conciliation and cooperation"63. At its recent meeting in Okinawa, Japan in July
                                                                                                                                                                    
Cyprus, 15 February 2000. This document can also be found in
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/cyprus.ceris3.htm
60 The Greek Cypriot side which regarded itself as the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus"
applied for the EU for membership in July 1990. For more details about Cyprus-EU relations see
Chapter III of this study.
61 see Appendix K for the text of the Confederation Proposal.
62 "Where do Parties Stand in Terms of a Negotiated
Settlement?"http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh07/06.htm, Turkish MFA.
63 "Cyprus and American Foreign Policy: A Guide to the Key Issues and Events",
http://www.ahiworld.org/cyprusguide.html
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2000, the G-8 "deplored the continuing division of Cyprus and reiterated its support
for this initiative"64.
Following the G-8 declaration in 1999, the UN Security Council passed its
resolution of 1250, adopted in June 1999. With this resolution, it called the parties to
negotiate without preconditions; with full consideration of UN resolutions; and with
good-faith. Resolution 1250 was followed by resolution 1251, in which the Security
Council reiterated its position on the Cyprus issue and stated that a future settlement
of the problem should be based on single sovereignty and citizenship, where the
political equality of the two communities, independence and territorial integrity will
be safeguarded65.
1.7.7 New UN Initiative (Proximity Talks)
The negotiations resulting from the Security Council resolutions of 1250 and
1251 took the form of proximity talks held under the auspices of the UN Secretary-
General since December 1999. The aim of the proximity talks was to prepare the
ground necessary for meaningful negotiations in order to initiate a comprehensive
settlement; and they were mainly focusing on four core issues: distribution of
powers, security, property, and territory.
For the Turkish side, in order to reach a reasonable settlement in those talks,
some realities should be acknowledged. A possible settlement should base on a freely
negotiated and mutually acceptable agreement, and the political consent of the two
communities. "Both peoples must feel that their concerns are equally valued and that
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65 For the text of these two resolutions - 1250 and 1251 - see Appendices L and M respectively.
22
the arrangements and institutions under an agreement will fully respect and protect
their interests, rights and distinct identities"66.
There took place five rounds of talks between the representatives of the two
communities so far. The fifth and the last round of UN-sponsored peace talks took
place in Geneva in November 2000, where the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan
presented his thoughts and ideas in an 11 page non-paper for a settlement in
Cyprus67. This proposal "referred to a 'single international legal personality' for
Cyprus and 'one sovereign indissoluble common state'68. This non-paper was rejected
by Rauf Denktash by declaring that there are great differences between the ideas of
the Secretary-General and the Turkish Cypriot side's. He also stated that he would
only attend the sixth-round of talks, which was scheduled in January, if amendments
in Annan's non-paper were made, where both sides given the equal status. With
Annan's proposal, the fifth round of UN-sponsored talks, aimed at ending the years-
long Cyprus problem, came to an end without any progress.
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67 see Appendix N for the text of Kofi Annan's non-paper.
68 "Long Cyprus Process" (The following article appeared in Kathimerini English Edition of Athens
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CHAPTER II
The Prospects of Solution Based on the Two Communities'
Views and Existing Positions
With the end of the Cold War, an increase in ethnic and nationalist
confrontations has been experienced from Asia and Africa to Europe. The revival of
nationalist aspirations has affected the structures, which are multinational in nature
and led to ethnic and nationalist conflicts. "Even in Western Europe, where countries
are moving towards a more integrated association and possibly a federal union,
ethno-regional communities such as the Basques, Catalans, Scots and Flemish are
demanding more and more autonomy"1. The concepts of territorial integrity and self-
determination became the primary principles, which led to successful secession of
sub-national peoples, both as recognised states (the former constituent republics of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) and as de facto states (Chechnya, Northern
Somaliland)2.
Cyprus is such an eastern Mediterranean island where there exist two
different ethno-religious communities living in one territory. The Cyprus conflict is
"an instance, indeed, of a general problem which has beset the world with the demise
                                                          
1 Zeliha Khashman, "Is A Federal Structure Really An Appropriate Political Solution For Multi-ethnic
Societies?," Perceptions 4, no. 2 (June-August 1999): 89.
2 Barry Bartmann, "Facing New Realities: The TRNC and Unrecognised States in the International
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of empires, namely how to treat minority communities which claim their freedom
from the new states set up after the departure of their colonial or other masters"3.
Cyprus is clearly divided into two in terms of culture, religion, language and origin
that one can not talk about a separate Cypriot Nation. The UN buffer zone,
established in 1963 with the deployment of UNFICYP on the island, is still dividing
the North from the South and works as a de facto border between the two
communities of the island4.
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1960 Partnership
Agreement, concluded between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, could last only
three years, and since 1963 the two communities have been living separately in two
different parts of the island. The Greek Cypriot administration in the South is
internationally recognised as the legitimate government of the whole island, and its
international acceptance emanates from UN Security Council Resolution 186 dated
on 4 March 19645. This UN resolution established the standard for other international
bodies, such as the Council of Europe and its organs like the European Commission
on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights; and the European
Union.
According to the opinion of the American jurist Monroe Leigh, "[f]rom 1964
to the present, the Greek Cypriot regime has claimed to be the legitimate government
of the Republic of Cyprus, with sovereign rights over the whole island and all its
inhabitants. [However], there is no basis in international law for such a claim"6. On
the other hand, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), declared in 1983,
                                                          
3 Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998), 5.
4 For details see Chapter I (footnote 33) of this study.
5 Since 1964, the Greek Cypriot side has been using this resolution to justify their position as they are
the only legitimate government of Cyprus. For the text of the Security Council Resolution 186 see
Appendix D.
6 Michael Stephen,"Cyprus and the Rule of Law,"Perceptions4, no.3(September-November 1999): 83.
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is recognised only by Turkey. Although it meets all the requirements for attaining
statehood7, it is still regarded as a de facto existence by the international community
within the framework of the UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 5508. In the
words of Christian Heinz, "[t]he Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a state in
the sense of the meaning of the term in international law, and is entitled to
recognition by all other states"9.
After the collapse of the 1960 settlement in 1963, "the Cyprus question has
revolved around issues such as the structure of possible future political organisation,
the delimitation of the borders between Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot
territories, the establishment of a guarantee system that would contribute to the
physical security of both communities, and the establishment of a political system
respecting the rights of the two communities"10.
During the period following the 1974 Turkish intervention on Cyprus, both
sides - the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots - tried to settle the dispute and to
serve this aim, direct negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus were
commenced by the UN Secretaries-General on the basis of equality. From 1977 till
1997, the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus negotiated on the basis of a bi-
communal and bi-zonal federation, in accordance with several resolutions of the
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General Assembly and the Security Council. Till 1997, bi-communality and bi-
zonality were accepted as the main principles of a future federation, since the
European Union (EU) membership of Cyprus was not under consideration at that
time. Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus was restricted by the 1960 Treaties, not to
join any [international organisations], like the EU11.
Those mediation attempts were commenced by the Four Guidelines in 1977
and then the Ten Point Agreement in 197912, which were reached by the then
representatives of the Greek Cypriots, respectively Archbishop Makarios and Mr.
Spiros Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot representative Mr. Rauf Denktash, to set
the basic principles required for a settlement in Cyprus.
In 1977, the Four Guidelines was reached between Makarios and Denktash.
Then in 1979, the Ten Point Agreement was produced by Kyprianou and Denktash,
which confirmed the Four Guidelines of the Makarios-Denktash Summit of 1977. By
those agreements the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal
federation was accepted as the common aim. Moreover, they opened the way for the
discussion of three freedoms, i.e, the freedom of movement, the freedom of
settlement and the right to own property, which are set as one of the main principles
by the Greek Cypriot side in recent negotiations.
Though those principles continued to be the basis of future negotiations for
many years, they were not drafted tightly enough to prevent a wide degree of
interpretation by either side. Although both sides seemed to be committed to the idea
of a federal settlement, in fact, they have different perceptions of what a federation is
and how it would be implemented in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots emphasised the
                                                          
11 Haluk Kabaalioğlu, "Greek Cypriot Application for European Union membership," Perceptions 4,
no. 3 (September-November 1999): 121.
12 The Four Guidelines of 1977 and the Ten Point Agreement of 1979 were named as the High-Level
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unity and indivisibility of the whole island, and they sought a unified federal state
with strong powers under Greek Cypriot control. In addition, they aimed to have a
bi-communal federal republic composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
"provinces", where the Turkish Cypriots would not be given equal powers. "The
powers of the provinces would mainly relate to local government and the residual
powers would rest with the federation. In addition, in the federal institutions Greek
Cypriots would be in the majority and there was no provision for any veto by either
community"13.
On the other side, the Turkish Cypriots favoured a federal settlement, which
would stress their equality as a co-founder, and provide for equal representation in
legislative and other institutions. Furthermore, unlike the Greek Cypriot side, they
insisted that residual powers would rest with the constituent states. The Turkish
Cypriot side agreed to accept a federal settlement only if it will be in a loose form
and they were also very insistent on the issue of equality in the operation of federal
institutions. For them, the federal structure should leave governmental responsibility
to the constituent parties which made up the federal body. However, this view
contradicted with the Greek Cypriots who proposed a tighter form of federation
including single citizenship14.
Following those High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, there took place
many mediation attempts of the UN Secretaries-General, which proved fruitless in
reaching a comprehensive solution during 1970s and 1980s. In June 1992, the
Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, invited the leaders of the two
communities to discuss the Set of Ideas aiming at having an overall framework
agreement on Cyprus. Set of Ideas was the most detailed plan, comprising of 100
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paragraphs, which has ever been put forward on the Cyprus conflict. Furthermore, it
was the last document, which both leaders had accepted, and it was accompanied
with a map, in which territorial adjustments were proposed. It was endorsed by the
Security Council Resolution 774, dated 26 August 1992 as the "basis for reaching an
overall framework agreement for the solution of the Cyprus problem"15.
Between 18-23 June 1992, five meetings were held with each leader in New
York. It was agreed that these talks would be resumed on 15 July. During the period
of resumed proximity talks (15 July-11 August), the UN Secretary-General and his
representatives had a number of separate meetings with the two leaders. These talks
focused on territorial adjustments and displaced persons, which constituted two of
the eight headings of the Secretary-General's Set of Ideas16. The Secretary-General
was expecting that the parties would accept the Set of Ideas17 completely and
unconditionally, which would lead to a comprehensive settlement of the issue.
The Secretary-General also pointed out that he would not propose the
discussion of other issues unless a reasonable progress could be achieved on those
two issues. In general terms, the Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it "basically
agreed" with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs of the Set of Ideas. On the other hand, the
Greek Cypriot side stated that it had accepted the Set of Ideas as "a basis for reaching
an overall framework agreement [but] subject to any improvement for the benefit of
both communities"18.
                                                          
15 see Appendix Q for the text of the Security Council Resolution 774.
16 Set of Ideas has eight headings. Namely; 1. displaced persons, 2. constitutional aspects, 3. territorial
adjustments, 4. overall objectives, 5. guiding principles, 6. security and guarantee, 7. economic
development and safeguards and 8. transitional arrangements.
17 see Appendix I for the text of the Set of Ideas.
18 Chris Economides, "Cyprus Problem Solution Prospects: Federal vs Confederal Solution",
http://www.cytanet.com.cy/cyprus-problem/body2.html, December 2000.
29
The Set of Ideas was a detailed plan for the solution of all aspects of the
Cyprus problem on the following basis, which was provided by paragraph 4 of the
Set of Ideas:
The overall framework agreement ensures that the Cyprus
settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty
and international personality and a single citizenship, with its
independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising
two politically equal communities…in a bi-communal and bi-zonal
federation, and that the settlement must exclude union with in
whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or
secession19.
The leading idea of the 1992 Set of Ideas was to create a loose federation in
which each side would manage most of its affairs on its own defined territory. In this
settlement, power would be shared in a central government, where foreign and
defence policy, a common currency and customs would be under control20.
Even the Set of Ideas could not put an end to the Cyprus problem, since the
"three freedoms", which the Turkish Cypriots were so sensitive about, were to be
included in the federal constitution. Refugees were to be allowed back to their homes
and the map presented provided the area of Morphou (Guzelyurt) to the Greek
Cypriots. The proposed territorial arrangements were rejected by the Turkish
Cypriots. Unlike the proposals of the Set of Ideas, which solved the question of
sovereignty under the formula of "a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and
international personality, and a single citizenship", the Turkish Cypriot side insisted
on the recognition of their own sovereignty21.
                                                          
19 This paragraph can be found under the heading of "Overall Objectives" of the Set of Ideas.
20 Thomas Omestad, "The Perils and Benefits of a Separated Cyprus," US News and World Report,
123, no. 23 ( December 1997): 42.
21 "The Secretary-General observed that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides, and
as long as this situation continues, it could not be possible to have a successful outcome". See also
Clement H. Dodd, "Constitutional Aspects of the Cyprus Problem," 347.
30
Until the beginning of 1990s, the Turkish Cypriot side's position for a
reasonable settlement in Cyprus could be explained by a bi-zonal and bi-communal
federal settlement. "Turkish Cypriots demand a solution based on two equal and
separate states which only forfeit the most necessary powers, such as security and
foreign policy, as well as a common legal framework and overall economic policy
guidelines, to a common central authority within the framework of a federation"22.
However, as of July 1990, the existing situation began to be challenged by the
Greek Cypriot side, since it applied to the EU for membership by ignoring the reality
that Cyprus is a two-community island. The situation took its final form with the
Luxembourg Summit of 1997 that the Greek part of Cyprus was included in the EU's
enlargement process. Following the decisions taken in the European Council held in
Luxembourg in 1997, the EU started the formal accession negotiations with the
Republic of Cyprus on March 31, 1998. However, "[t]he EU did not realise that by
introducing the issue of membership…[to] the EU, where member states transfer
some of their sovereign powers to Community institutions, the parameters on which
the solution was based completely changed"23.
With this application, whose legality still remains highly challengeable, there
took place a significant change in the Turkish Cypriot view concerning Cyprus that
the idea of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal settlement was replaced with the idea
of a two-state confederation between the TRNC and the internationally recognised
Greek Cypriot administration. The Turkish Cypriot side insists on the recognition of
the existence of two separate states in the island as a basis for any future settlement,
                                                          
22 Heinz Kramer, "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," Survival 39, no.3 (Autumn 1997):
22.
23 Haluk Kabaalioğlu, "Greek Cypriot Application for European Union Membership,", 121.
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since a unilateral application to a membership was an evidence of the reality of
another state, namely TRNC.
The increasing feeling of insecurity among the members of two communities
against each other as well as the feeling of distrust obstruct cooperation and prevent
the evolution of a common understanding. The increasing animosity between the two
communities is similar to the one between the Palestinians and Israelis or the
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Each community has its version of
history, which does not reflect the entire truth24. There exists more animosity
between north and south Cyprus than between India and Pakistan. Though there are
two religions in India and Pakistan, they share the same culture and language. But in
Cyprus, there are clearly two religions and languages25. Moreover, in the case of
Cyprus, the relationship between the two communities is often influenced by the
bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. Under these circumstances, the
question is which political system could merge the two communities as well as
prepare the ground for an extensive cooperation among them. Recently, there are two
different formulas, which are being debated internationally. One is the confederation
formula, demanded by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side; and the other is the bi-
zonal and bi-communal federation formula approved by Greece and the Greek
Cypriot side.
2.1 Features of a Confederation?
Confederations as a state system are described as:
Associations of autonomous states that agree to the joint exercise
of power and the limitation of their sovereignty in a number of
defined areas of governmental activity, such as defence, trade,
public health and environment, in order to ensure the achievement
                                                          
24 "Cyprus: A Threat to Peace", http://www.dailystarnews.com/199809/18/n8091809.htm
25 Kıbrıs, Northern Cyprus Monthly, Vol. VIII, No.2, February 2000, Lefkoşa.
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of a common purpose through the establishment of some joint
machinery of deliberation and decision-making and a jointly
manned central administration26.
In Encyclopedia Britannica confederations are described as:
Voluntary associations of independent states that, to secure some
common purpose, agree to certain limitations on their freedom of
action and establish some joint machinery of consultation or
deliberation. The limitations on the freedom of action of the
member states may be as trivial as an acknowledgment of their
duty to consult with each other before taking some independent
action or as significant as the obligation to be bound by majority
decisions of the member states27.
In political terminology, a confederation refers to a union of sovereign states,
each of which is free to act independently28. "In modern times the term confederation
is applied to a joining together of formerly independent states to create a single
political unit"29. Canadian Confederation can be given as an example of modern and
recent confederations, although technically it is a federation. The same is also true in
the case of Switzerland. Although it is called a "Confederation Helvetic", it is
actually a cantonial federation. The reason is that until the 19th century, the Cantons,
which make up Switzerland, were members of a loose Confederation. However, in
1848, they decided to amend their Constitution and make it a federal one, which
continues to be the same with some small amendments, up to now. Just for historical
reasons, they decided to continue with the previous name, "Confederation
                                                          
26 Clement Dodd, "Constitutional Conundrums", conference paper in Centre for the Study of
International Relations and Strategic Studies (CERIS), ULB, The Need for New Perspectives on
Cyprus, 15 February 2000. This document can also be found in
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/cyprus.ceris3.htm
27 It is taken from the website of Encyclopedia Britannica
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/ab/article/7/0,5716,115177+4+108574,00.html
28 http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?z=1&pg=2ti=761575840
29 ibid.
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Helvetic"30. Furthermore, the European Union can also be given as an example of
modern confederations.
According to Professor Daniel J. Elazar:
Confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived as
the post-modern form of federalism that seems to be particularly
useful in connecting politically sovereign states that must
accommodate themselves to the realities of the new times. These
include the growing interdependence among states deemed
politically sovereign, the desire for linkage among states and
peoples that will not require them to merge into new nations but
enable them to preserve their separate national identities and
existence, and recognition of the realities of ethnic distinctiveness
and, at times, conflict31.
This implies that the equality of its constituent states and their "togetherness"
for certain common purposes are the main features of a confederal system.
2.2 What is A Federation?
Again in Encyclopedia Britannica the term federation is used to refer to
"groupings of states, often on a regional basis, that establish central executive
machinery to implement policies or to supervise joint activities. In some cases such
groupings are motivated primarily by political and economic concerns; in others,
military objectives are paramount"32. Furthermore, federal arrangements are national
or international political systems in which the same territory and citizens are
controlled by two levels of government. "Countries with federal political systems
have both a central government and governments based on smaller political units,
                                                          
30 Chris Economides, "Cyprus Problem Solution Prospects: Federal vs Confederal Solution"
http://www.cytanet.com.cy/cyprus-problem/body2.html, December 2000.
31 see Ergün Olgun, "Why Confederation for Cyprus," Conference on Confederal Structure: A Time
For A New Look For Cyprus (4-5 March 2000): 1.
32  It is taken from the website of Encyclopedia Britannica
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/ab/article/7/0,5716,115177+4+108574,00.html
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usually called states, provinces, or territories. These smaller political units surrender
some of their political power to the central government, relying on it to act for the
common good"33.
In federal systems, power is not centralised, it is "polycentric"; and it is
spread among a number of centers, where powers are divided and shared among
those various centers. So there is no single center or single body that can make
decisions as to who does what, when and how34.
In the words of Dr. Daniel J. Elazar, federalism is:
The combination of self-rule and shared rule in one way or another.
In other words, a polity, an entity, a community that wants to have
a substantial measure of self-rule, self-government finds itself also
in a position where in order to achieve the maximum of self-
government, it has to share some aspects of government with other
polities or entities or communities. Federalism is the way in which
self-rule is combined with shared rule to enable polities to remain
as independent as possible and yet gain the benefits of cooperation
in a highly interdependent world35.
Federalism, in this sense, implies more relationships among the entities,
which involve partnership. In federal political systems, power and resources are
divided between central and regional governments. The balance of power between
the two levels of government varies from country to country, but in most cases
substantial autonomy is granted to state or provincial governments. Central
governments decide issues that concern the whole country, such as organising an
army, building major roads, and making treaties with other countries. In practice,
federal systems vary so that in some countries with federal systems, the central
                                                          
33 http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?z=1&pg=2ti=761572095&cid=9#p9
34 Tassos Anastasiades, "Federalism - Interview with Prof. Daniel Elazar",
http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/federal.htm, This interview was also published in the
Phileleftheros Newspaper on 3 January 1998.
35 It is taken from a speech by Dr. Daniel Elazar on "The Flexibility of Federalism"
http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/elazar.htm
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government plays a large role in community planning, schools, and other local
issues36.
According to Elazar, one of the best features of a federal system is that there
is no one model. Every federal arrangement finds the model suitable to its structure
or develops one of its own37.
In Clement Dodd's words a "[f]ederation, …, is certainly a safety valve in
certain circumstances, especially when a unitary state is seen to be too oppressive for
the cultural and political aspirations of ethnic or other types of groups"38.
The United States can be given as an example of a federal system, which was
come into being in 1787. Also, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Germany have
federal systems.
2.3 The differences between the two state types
The main difference between a federation and confederation is that a
federation has a single international personality and sovereignty, whereas in a
confederation each partner has its own international personality and sovereignty.
In a confederal system, the government has fewer powers and it operates
through its constituent states, whereas in a federation the federal government has
more powers and it can operate directly with its citizenry in the fields where the
constitution gives powers39.
The third main difference is that in a federal system, the main State powers
and functions, such as foreign policy, economic and monetary policy, citizenship and
                                                          
36 http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?z=1&pg=2ti=761572095&cid=9#p9
37 This information is taken from a telephone interview with Daniel J. Elazar on 7 December 1998.
http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/elazar2.htm
38 Clement H. Dodd, "Confederation, Federation and Sovereignty," Perceptions 4, no. 3 (September-
November 1999): 23-24.
39 Tassos Anastasiades, "Federalism - Interview with Prof. Daniel Elazar",
http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/federal.htm, 3 January 1998.
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defence, are under the governance of the federal government. However, in a
confederation, these powers are in the hands of each constituent state40.
A confederation is similar to a federal system, but it gives less power to the
central government, whereas in federations the individual states are subordinate to
the central government. Central governments in confederal arrangements decide only
on issues which affect all members of the confederation. For example, when the
Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, many of its former Republics formed a
confederation called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to coordinate
domestic and foreign policy41. "The loose alliances of countries or other political
entities that make up a confederation seek to cooperate with one another while
retaining ultimate control of their own internal policies"42. Unlike federal political
systems, confederations usually give each member nation absolute control over its
citizens and territory.
In theory, federation and confederation are two different types of political
systems; however, in practice, they often overlap. For example, although Canadian
and Swiss types of governments are called confederations, they are actually
federations; and "[i]n the American civil war federal and confederal forces fought
each other, but whose central government was tighter than the other, no one
knows"43. National unions, which have started as a confederation often change into a
federation in the course of time, that "[h]istorically, confederations have often proved
to be a first or second step toward the establishment of a national state, usually as a
federal union. Thus,…Germany's modern federal arrangements may be traced to the
                                                          
40 Chris Economides, "Cyprus Problem Solution Prospects: Federal vs Confederal Solution"
http://www.cytanet.com.cy/cyprus-problem/body2.html December 2000.
41 http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?z=1&pg=2ti=761572095&cid=9#p9
42 ibid.
43 "President Denktash launches Cyprus Confederation", http://www.turkpulse.com/present.htm
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German Confederation of the 19th century (the Deutsche Bund); and the federal
constitution of the United States is the successor to the government of the Articles of
Confederation"44.
Confederal systems have a disadvantage in that they tend to be weak and
unstable, since member nations are often reluctant in relinquishing the authority on
any matters, and they insist on keeping their right to withdraw from the
confederation at any time. In modern times, confederations are uncommon; and most
are international bodies with limited and specific responsibilities, such as the
European Community (EC) and the British Commonwealth45.
In the case of Cyprus, when a confederal arrangement may think of as a
possible settlement, the two communities would form some loose federal
arrangement, where the powers of the central government is weak and with most of
the powers emanating from the two provinces. On the other hand when a federal
settlement is concerned, then the two communities would join together in a state
where the central government is relatively strong, and where considerable powers are
left to the two constituent states46.
2.4 Turkish Cypriot side's Proposal of Confederation47
On 31 August 1998, Rauf Denktash, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side
proposed to establish, with the Greek Cypriot side, a confederation in Cyprus. For
Denktash, the confederation proposal is consistent with the 1960 Agreements, since
it "enables both sides to cooperate in peace and harmony and also by addressing the
                                                          
44 http://www.britannica.com/bcom/ab/article/7/0,5716,115177+4+108574,00.html
45 http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?z=1&pg=2ti=761572095&cid=9#p9
46 Fatma Güven Lisaniler and Jonathan Warner, "Cyprus: Bridge or Bunker?: The Cyprus Problem
and prospects for its resolution,"Perceptions 3, no. 1 (March-May 1998): 101
47 see Appendix K for the text of Confederation Proposal.
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legitimate interests of all sides for longer term stability. It is also consistent with the
efforts of the UN to reach a mutually acceptable settlement. The beginnings of
federations have usually been confederal agreements between two equals"48.
Furthermore, the idea of confederation is desirable, since it enables peoples "to
preserve their separate national identity, existence and political sovereignty while
allowing them to build a working cooperative relationship based on the joint exercise
of certain agreed powers and functions on matters considered to be confederal by the
founding agreement of the confederation"49.
This proposal aimed the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between
the TRNC and Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA); and envisaged the continuation
of the 1960 Guarantee system. With this proposal, Denktash, on behalf of the
Turkish Cypriot people, aimed at addressing all the needs of both sides in order to
have a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side defines the
confederal proposal as "a realistic and constructive proposal, which will provide for
the security of both sides as well as the safeguarding of the identities of the two
peoples, which will enjoy sovereign equality"50. For them, confederation of states is
the only arrangement that would allow two different peoples and states on the island
to live in peace under one roof and which would lead to cooperation.
For the Turkish Cypriot side, a possible solution could be found if the
changing realities of Cyprus and following principles are accepted by the Greek
Cypriot side. These are :
                                                          
48 Rauf Denktash, "The Crux of the Cyprus Problem," Perceptions 4, no. 3 (September-November
1999): 22.
49 see Ergün Olgun, "Why Confederation for Cyprus," Conference on Confederal Structure: A Time
For A New Look For Cyprus (4-5 March 2000): 1.
50 Kıbrıs, Northern Cyprus Monthly, Vol. VIII, no.7, July 2000, Lefkoşa.
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- The Greek Cypriot people together with the Turkish Cypriots exercised their
rights of self-determination separately and signed the international agreements
of 1960. The 1960 state of affairs, created by international treaties governing
Cyprus, was established by three Guarantor Powers and the two communities
of Cyprus. "In the context of Cyprus, the status of 'Community, as a signatory
to international treaties, denoted the cultural, religious, linguistic, social and
political identity of each of the two constituent peoples'. Thus, the two peoples,
by being parties to all the international treaties, became themselves subjects of
international law"51.
The Turkish Cypriot side claims that there exists an inequality between
the two sides of the island, since the Greek Cypriot administration is
internationally recognised as the legitimate government of the whole of Cyprus
with the UN Security Council Resolution 186, dated 4 March 1964, whereas
the existence of the TRNC is totally ignored, except Turkey. For the Turkish
Cypriot side, the Security Council Resolution 186, dated 4 March 1964,
prepared all the necessary ground for the Greek Cypriot side to justify their
positions as the legitimate government of the whole island. "From then
onwards, the Cyprus problem was solved in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot
side"52.
Therefore, in order to repair this inequality gap between the two
communities of Cyprus, the separate sovereign existence of the TRNC should
                                                          
51 This implies that the separate existence of the Turkish Cypriots was already recognised by the 1960
international treaties, where the three guarantor powers became parties. However, there still exists a
contradiction here which is that by the 1960 treaties, the Turkish Cypriot people had become an equal
partner that helped to establish the 1960 state of affairs together with the Greek Cypriots. But now the
Greek Cypriot administration is regarded as the sole representative of the whole island under the title
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absent for about 38 years. See Mumtaz Soysal, "A Solution for Cyprus through Statehood,"
Perceptions 4, no. 3 (September-November 1999): 56-57.
52 Rauf Denktaş, "The Crux of the Cyprus Problem," 13.
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be acknowledged. They suggest that: "each community should form a
sovereign state and join in a confederation as equals. A 'union of republics' will
act jointly on certain issues. In time, and with trust, they can establish a
federation or confederation"53. For the Turkish Cypriot side it is not possible to
talk about any kind of settlement, which would be constructed by a state on the
one hand, and the community on the other, since this can not be equality.
- Greek Cypriots should respect the sovereign and political equality of the
Turkish Cypriot side. Equality, independence and international recognition
of the Turkish Cypriot side should constitute the major part of any future
arrangement.
- For security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side, bi-zonality is required and
they prefer limited contact between the two communities.
- The Turkish Cypriots demand the lifting of the embargoes, applied to the
northern part of the island, which greatly obstruct the economic development
of the Turkish North and make them more dependent on Turkey for their
survival and security. They believe that the South, as being the only
recognised Cyprus government under the title of the "Republic of Cyprus",
has used this advantage both to prosper economically and also to exert
international political and economic pressure on the North. They also believe
that the embargoes imposed on the TRNC are in violation of the "spirit" of
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the UN Charter and falls in contrary to the relevant international human
rights instruments54.
- For the Turkish Cypriots, the crux of the Cyprus problem is the application
of the Greek Cypriot side to the EU on behalf of the whole of the island.
TRNC President Rauf Denktash said on June 5, 2000, "EU membership
could not be on the Turkish Cypriot agenda until a solution was found to the
Cyprus issue"55. Turkish Cypriots fear that EU accession would invalidate
Turkey's rights and obligations as a guarantor power, since it is a non-
member, and put to an end to the de facto bi-zonality in the island56.
Furthermore, they are also afraid that the richer Greek Cypriots can freely
buy land and settle in the North which would obviously make the Turkish
Cypriots "an impoverished minority in a reunified republic dominated by the
Greek majority"57.
President Denktash stated that "the Greek Cypriots what they could
not do with force of arms and embargoes, they are now, with the help of
Greece whilst Turkey is outside of the EU, trying to do through the EU. The
aim by pushing Cyprus into the EU and saying 'we are ready to solve our
problem with the Turkish Cypriots', is to bring Turkey and the EU face-to-
face in Cyprus and to make the Cyprus issue an EU problem"58.
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56 Christopher de Bellaigue,"Conciliation in Cyprus?,"Washington Quarterly22,no.2(Spring 1999):183
57 Tozun Bahcheli and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "The Cyprus Impasse," World Policy Journal 13, no.
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- For security reasons, the Turkish Cypriot side is insisting on the continuation
of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, including the unilateral intervention right of
Turkey, since they believe that the Greek Cypriots have not given up their
objective of "Hellenising" the whole island. "In the past, the Greek Cypriots
aimed to Hellenise the island by uniting it with Greece; today they aim to
create a Hellenic state on the whole island"59. Territorial sovereignty
becomes a "vital pillar" of Turkish Cypriot security together with the
guarantee provided by Turkey under the 1960 Guarantee system, since the
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of being dominated by the Greek Cypriot side.
- When the "three freedoms" -freedom of movement, freedom of settlement
and the right to own property - are concerned, the Turkish Cypriots agree on
freedoms with restrictions. For the Turkish Cypriot side, "the basic
freedoms…are to be restricted because of the associated danger of
dominance by the larger community over the smaller one….Restoring Greek
Cypriot property rights in the north is also seen to be impossible: instead,
compensation for lost property has been offered…"60.
2.5 Greek Cypriot Formula of Federation
As a political system, the Greek Cypriot government is committed to a
settlement based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with a single
international personality, single sovereignty and single citizenship. In this structure,
the constituent states have very limited powers; while there will be a strong federal
                                                          
59Necati Munir Ertekun, "The Turkish Cypriot Outlook", Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives,
Clement H. Dodd (ed.) (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999): 99.
60 Heinz Kramer, "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," 22-23.
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(central) system. Glafcos Clerides, the President of the Greek Cypriot
Administration, responded to the question of what would be a fair solution to the
Cyprus problem, in a Press Conference dated 23 September 1999 that "the Greek
Cypriot side aims the creation of a federal state in the two areas of the island: one in
the north administered by the Turkish Cypriots; one in the south administered by the
Greek Cypriots; and a federal government in which both communities would be
represented"61.
However, their concept of federation is quite different from the one which
was supported by the Turkish side for many years. Both sides "differed on the means
of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots want their legitimate internationally
recognised national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who
would then join a Cypriot republic. The Turkish Cypriots believe that two legitimate
entities would join, for the first time, in a new federation"62.
They aim to have a federal solution, where the Turkish Cypriots will be given
only minority rights, which was stated in 1998, at the Assembly meeting of the
Western European Union (WEU), by George Papandreu, who is now the Greek
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He stated that, "if the Turkish Cypriots participate in EU
accession talks this would be a step for them, and brings to the agenda their minority
rights"63. The Greek Cypriots see the status of the Turkish Cypriots equal to that of a
minority and they explicitly express their view on every platform by saying that
"[t]he Turkish Cypriot community is already a minority in the occupied area"64.
                                                          
61 Taken from a Press Conference by Glafcos Clerides on 23 September 1999.
62 "Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations", http://www.fas.org/man/crs/89-140.htm
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According to the news, appeared in Alithia, the Greek Cypriot press, on 20
March 2000, as reported in the Turkish Daily Kıbrıs, the Greek Cypriot leader,
Glafcos Clerides, during a meeting with the Greek Foreign Ministry delegation, said
the following:
National leader Makarios has identified the possible and desired
solutions. This also determined his future policy on the Cyprus
problem. Certainly, the desired solution was not a federation. The
matter was what would be the possible solution that would also
secure the future of the Hellenic community. If you ask anyone,
even me, in what proportion I want a bi-communal, bi-zonal
federation, I will say 'no, I prefer a unitary state'. However, the
former is possible while the latter is desired65.
The quotation, which was taken from Filelefheros, a Greek Cypriot Daily, on
20 September 1992, Glafcos Clerides stated that: "[t]he best solution for us is no
solution…We, the Greek Cypriots, today have the government completely under our
control…Our government is the only one internationally recognised. Why should we
bring back the Turks?….Finally, they will have to accept our decisions - or go"66.
Those statements demonstrate the persistence of the Greek Cypriot desire for
enosis - union of Cyprus with the motherland Greece. Greek Cypriots are unlikely to
abandon this position in the visible future.
Like the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriots set some principles on
which a future settlement should depend, and they claim that the issues of territory,
property, security and distribution of power had to be settled in order to have a
reasonable settlement67:
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-   A future solution to the Cyprus problem is described by the Greek Cypriot
side as the establishment of "a federal state with a strong central authority
decisively influenced by the Greek majority, with ethnically determined
separate federated states for Turkish and Greek Cypriots restricted to narrow
down areas of self-rule"68. This implies that the Greek Cypriots are ready to
grant the Turkish Cypriots full self-administration for their internal affairs in
their zone, while keeping the central authority over affairs concerning the
whole island under their own control. Hence, the decision-making process
would be determined by the Greek Cypriot authority.
However, according to Greek Cypriot press (VARIOUS) of April 2,
2000, as reported in the Turkish Daily Kıbrıs, the results of a recent survey
conducted in South Cyprus revealed that the majority of the Greek Cypriot
population are not in favour of a federal settlement despite the statements made
by the Greek Cypriot Leadership, who highly insists on a federation. In this
survey, only 1.5% of the Greek Cypriots surveyed, stated their readiness to
accept a federal settlement69.
- For the Greek Cypriots, the roots of the Cyprus problem lie in the 1974
Turkish intervention. Therefore, they regard the existence of Turkish troops
as "occupation forces" and call the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the
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island. They also reject the Turkish guarantee and right of unilateral
intervention. They regard the full withdrawal of the Turkish army as the sine
qua non condition for security, and they claim the demilitarisation of the
island as the most significant step towards creating a feeling of security
among both communities70.
- On security matters, "the Greek Cypriots will only discuss an internationally
guaranteed status that is ensured by an appropriate international military
presence. Indeed, Greek and Turkish forces could participate in an
international force, but scope for military intervention should be specifically
excluded from any guarantee"71
- They insist on the realisation of the three freedoms - the freedom of
movement, settlement and property ownership - which implies that all
displaced persons should have the right to return to their properties as well as
the right to acquire property in the North. They also want the return of some
territory, particularly in the Guzelyurt (Morphou).
For the Greek Cypriots, substantial readjustments should be made for the
return of as many Greek Cypriot refugees as possible to their homes and
properties. A 75 to 25 per cent territorial arrangement may provide some
incentives for the Greek Cypriot side to show flexibility in some other issues.
Within this new territorial arrangement, a substantial portion of coastline should
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be returned to the Greek Cypriots, which is currently control only about 37 per
cent of the coastline72.
They envision a modern European society with free movement of
people73. They also call for the restoration of basic freedoms as fully as possible,
and demand an extensive restitution of property rights of Greek Cypriots and
territorial division, which would reflect the numerical strength of both
communities74. "The Greek [Cypriot] side has always argued that the non-return
of Greek Cypriots to their former homes in the North is a gross violation of
international norms regarding human rights"75.
-   The Greek Cypriot side stated that the sensitive issue of sovereignty for
Northern Cyprus was "not negotiable"76, therefore they rejected the
confederation proposal of the Turkish Cypriot side, since it would imply the
acceptance of the separate sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriots, the
TRNC. They justified their rejection of this proposal by stating that it was
against the already accepted parameters77, which were set by the UN for the
solution of the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots rejected the Confederation
proposal of the Turkish Cypriot side, since they believed that such a settlement
would lead to the dissolution of the internationally recognised Republic of
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Cyprus and its replacement by a new "two-state confederal entity with
indeterminate or a rather weak international identity and representation"78.
-   For the Greek Cypriots, the TRNC does not fulfil the requirements of attaining
statehood. They claim that the population actually does not constitute a people,
because they are mainly settlers occupying land and property, whose legal owners
are the Greek Cypriots79. Also they claim that there exist no real border between
the North and the South. It is actually an armistice line between Turkish troops
and the National Guard. Furthermore, it is claimed that the TRNC is under the
control of Turkey, which provides the TRNC every means of support and without
which it could exist80.
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CHAPTER III
International Prospects of Solution for the Cyprus Problem
The eastern Mediterranean region covers the Aegean Sea and the territories of
Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Egypt and Cyprus. Besides those above
mentioned states, Cyprus, as an island, has an increasing effect on the stability as
well as the security of this region. Rather than its geo-strategic importance, it highly
carries the risk of a Greco-Turkish dispute, which has had significant repercussions
on eastern Mediterranean security.
Throughout its history, Cyprus has been under the influence or direct control
of the dominant powers in the eastern Mediterranean. First the Ottomans and then the
British were the last two conquerors and rulers of the island. "Cyprus' location, at the
junction of three continents [and at the heart of the eastern Mediterranean]
overlooking the Middle East has through centuries made the island an attractive asset
to [Western] powers wishing to dominate or have influence in this area"1.
Recently when Cyprus is concerned, "energy security" is the crucial problem,
since the island is geographically located "at the apex of two geo-strategic triangles
the importance of which is immensely growing:
a. in the north with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and
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b. in the south with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf"2.
With the end of the Cold War, new opportunities as well as threats began to
be observed in this region within which Cyprus is located. On the one hand, there are
emerging markets, new sources of energy and new relationships providing increasing
economic and political opportunities to the region and to the world. On the other
hand, religious fanaticism, nationalism, terrorism and nuclear proliferation are some
of the new threats that the region is facing. In this environment, "Cyprus plays a key
role in the multi-regional strategic calculus of the eastern Mediterranean,
incorporating south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus"3.
Today, regional politics are more important than they used to be in the Cold
War period. Every regional power is interested in every problem within the region
and almost all countries are interested in the Cyprus issue. For that reason, it is hard
to find a third party that is not, directly or indirectly, involved in the Cyprus issue4.
Here, it is not possible to mention all those third parties involved in the Cyprus issue,
since it is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, only the policies of the major
outside actors, such as the United States particularly and the European Union
recently; and the two mother countries of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities, Greece and Turkey respectively, will be mentioned.
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3.1 United States
The United States has been one of the major outside players in the Cyprus
dispute, and its policy toward Cyprus should be seen within the context of US goals
in Europe and the Middle East during and after the Cold War. "When the senior US
policy makers think of the Mediterranean, they think first and foremost of the eastern
Mediterranean, above all Greece and Turkey as well as the Black Sea region. They
also see the Mediterranean as the stepping stone to both the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf"5. As a result of the end of the Cold War, US goals have undergone an
important change, due to the growing importance of the security and stability of the
eastern Mediterranean region mentioned above. There is also another factor, which is
highly and increasingly influential in US policy toward Cyprus. This is the strong
involvement of Greek-American lobby in the Congress, which highly influences the
US policy-making concerning Cyprus.
During the Cold War period, US and European security were closely linked,
since there was a threat of a Soviet military expansion, which explained the US
engagement in Europe. Therefore, throughout the Cold War period, the main US
concern was to deter the outbreak of conflict between Greece and Turkey. Such an
action might weaken NATO's solidarity and effectiveness on its southern flank,
which might allow the Soviet Union to expand its powers and influence in the
eastern Mediterranean6. For the US, the Cyprus issue is an important part of "the
strategic equation in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, and [a] Cyprus
crisis could endanger these interests as well as weaken NATO"7. Therefore, Cyprus
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should develop economically and stay democratic with a pro-Western orientation,
and a possible outbreak of conflict between Greece and Turkey should be deterred.
Another concern was Cyprus' proximity to the Middle East. The two British
bases on the island contributed to enhancing Allied military presence and capability
in the region. All these circumstances "translated into the following practical policy
toward Cyprus: the United States inserted itself only when the stability of the island
was threatened in order to protect its own - and NATO's - interests"8.
Before 1974, the Cyprus question brought Greece and Turkey close to war
twice - first in 1964 and then in 1967. During these crises, the main objective of the
United States was for the situation to "be transformed from a danger to a problem"9.
In the 1964 crisis, inter-communal disagreements over the 1960 constitution
reached its peak in 1963, and the Greek Cypriot nationalists began attacking Turkish
Cypriot civilians in December 1963. Massacres conducted by the Greek Cypriot
militia against the Turkish Cypriots led Turkey to decide on intervention on
Cyprus10. Seeking to reduce tensions and prevent any Turkish action over Cyprus,
President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish President Ismet Inonu11. With
this letter, a possible Turkish intervention could be deterred by the United States.
Search for a permanent solution to the Cyprus question was continued with
the sending of Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State of the United States, to
the island. The plan proposed by Acheson in July 1964 was actually a synthesis of
                                                          
8 Ivar-Andre Slengesol, "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," Mediterranean
Quarterly 20, no. 2, (Spring 2000): 98.
9 George Kaloudis, "Cyprus: The enduring conflict," International Journal on World Peace 16, no.1
(March 1999): 14.
10 Due to those events, the Turkish Grant National Assembly took a decision, no. 135, on date 16
March 1964 to send the Turkish military troops to Cyprus.
11 A key passage of the letter is as follows: "A military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to
a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not
had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent of its NATO allies".
53
enosis and taksim (partition). With this plan, most of Cyprus was to be united with
Greece, whereas Turkey was to be given a sector in the north. Besides, there would
be autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons within the Greek area. However, this
initiative could not produce any results since it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot
community and mainland Greece12.
Although the US was able to prevent Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1964,
it could not resolve the crisis. Tensions in the island increasingly continued, and as a
result crisis broke out once again in December 1967, due to "enosis-inspired" attacks
on two Turkish Cypriot villages. Those attacks immediately led to a strong reaction
of Turkey, which once again brought Greece and Turkey close to war13. To deter
Turkish intervention, President Johnson sent his special envoy, Cyrus Vance, to
Cyprus. Shuttling between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, he succeeded in resolving the
crisis only temporarily, by securing the withdrawal of Greek forces together with
General Grivas14.
Despite all initiatives of the United States aimed at defusing the repeated
crises, inter-communal conflicts could not be eliminated. Tensions, once again,
reached its peak in July 1974, with a coup organised by Greek military junta against
Makarios in Cyprus. The Greek fait accompli against the independence of Cyprus led
the Ankara government to exercise its rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty
of Guarantee15. Turkey intervened to prevent the island's annexation by Greece as
well as to protect the Turkish Cypriot people from total annihilation.
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The 1974 Cyprus crisis had significant impacts on US relations with both
Greece and Turkey. Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO where it
returned in 1980, and the Turkish-American relations soured as a result of the arms
embargo imposed by the US Congress against Turkey from early 1975 to late 1978.
In this embargo decision, the Greek lobby's influence could not be
underestimated. During his stay in the USA, Archbishop Makarios had carried out
extensive propaganda among the Greek-Americans and had provoked them to press
the US administration to apply sanctions against Turkey. Finally, the influential
Greek lobby in Congress succeeded in postponing the ratification of the Defence
Cooperation Agreement between the USA and Turkey, which was waiting in the
Congress. Besides, an embargo was imposed on arms supplies to Turkey from early
1975 to late 1978. The justification used for the "embargo" was that during the peace
operation in Cyprus, Turkey had used NATO arms supplied by the USA. The Greek
lobby argued that such use of American arms was contrary to the US Foreign
Assistance Act16. The attempt to link the Cyprus issue with the bilateral relations
between Turkey and the USA could only result in the breakdown of co-operation
between the two countries, and indeed the reflections of this initiative had effects on
the relations.
In the United States, the Greek-American lobby is one of the most crucial
factors, which determinates the policy-making over Cyprus. This interest group,
which is composed of a number of organisations, focuses on Greek-Turkish issues as
well as the Cyprus issue. It generally sees the interest of Greece and the Greek
Cypriots as similar to that of the American ones17. For the past four decades, it has
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heavily as well as increasingly influenced the way the US government deals with the
Cyprus issue, and "[t]he aftermath of the 1974 crisis led to an unprecedented
intensification of American efforts toward Cyprus, and the concurrent involvement
of the Congress in policy formulation"18.
The Greek-American lobby has been affective in convincing legislators in
congress (and similar groups in other Western parliaments) that the Cyprus issue
began with the Turkish military takeover of northern Cyprus in 1974 and the
continuing occupation of 40 per cent of the island by the Turkish Cypriots. For the
Greek-American lobby, the Cyprus issue is mostly about getting the Turkish military
off the island and less about the ways to reconcile the two communities of the island.
They are also trying to keep pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots by
blocking any international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot government other than
by Turkey19.
Until the end of the Cold War, the policies of the United States in the eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East can be summarised as to provide security to
Israel, to insure the free flow of oil from the gulf into the Mediterranean, and to
prevent Soviet supremacy in the region20. However, with the end of the Cold War,
the Soviet threat is no longer worry the United States as it did during the Cold War
period. The end of the Cold War has not led to the US withdrawal from Europe or
the end of the Atlantic Alliance, but led to a change in US strategic priorities.
Stability in Europe still remains important to the US, but it does not have the
centrality in US policy that it had during the Cold War period. US defence planning
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is no longer focused on preventing an attack on Europe but on Europe's periphery
and beyond Europe's borders21. Besides, Cyprus "was and still is treated as an
undesirable intrusion into broader US interests: oil pipelines, the Arab-Israeli peace
process, and Iraq's future role in the world"22.
Besides, "energy security" which was mentioned above, constitutes the higher
priority in the US policy-making, when Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean region
are concerned. Therefore, the USA has favoured a more active and direct
involvement in the Cyprus issue. In general, the US policy can be summarised as to
give close as well as active support to UN mediation efforts by means of appointing
special presidential emissaries and special Cyprus coordinators, who are conducting
series of meeting with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. "A consistent theme of all
administrations from President Carter until the present day is that the US seek to
ensure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus"23.
During the 1996 presidential election campaign President Bill Clinton24
declared that "resolution of the Cyprus problem would be a 'high priority' for his
second term"25. He expressed his commitment in finding a solution to the Cyprus
problem and assured that his administration will intensify its efforts. "I want to
assure you that I am just as committed to finding a solution to the problems that
plague Cyprus as I am to advancing peace elsewhere in the world," Clinton said26.
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Following his re-election in 1996, he appointed Richard Holbrooke as special
envoy to promote the Cyprus settlement. Holbrooke stressed that:
The US Secretary of State's 'personal involvement' in the
announcement as well as the planned contacts with Greek and
Turkish leaders are 'another indication of…engagement of the
United States in solving the security problems of this region, and
instability in this region is a direct threat to America's national
interests27.
The underlying position of the United States concerning a settlement in
Cyprus is the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, which will be
consistent with the UN Security Council Resolutions28. The position of the United
States on the guarantorship of Cyprus is the deployment of a multi-national NATO
force, which will guarantee the security of the both communities of the island.
Parallel to this, it supports the complete demilitarisation of the island, where only a
small police force with light arms could be remained. Furthermore, concerning the
"three freedoms" - the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right
to own property - the United States is concentrating on the freedom of movement and
right to settlement, which will enable the maximum amount of Greek Cypriots to
return to the North.
3.2 The European Union
As it was mentioned above, the Eastern Mediterranean region is the region,
which is gaining more significance in the post-Cold war era, and seems to face many
challenges in the near future. Like the United States, the EU attaches great concern to
the security, stability and cooperation in this region, which will be crucial for its own
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security as well as prosperity29. The involvement of the EU to the Cyprus problem
could be explained as a great step toward adopting a new role in European and
international affairs if it is successful in contributing substantially toward its peaceful
resolution. The solution of the Cyprus problem and the accession of Cyprus as a
whole to the EU would symbolise "the commitment of the EU to decisive
involvement in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, failure to follow an assertive
policy may be indicative of the inability of the EU to act even on the basis of its own
declarations"30.
The relations between the European Community and the Greek Cypriot
administration began on 19 December 1972, with the signing of an association
agreement, which went into effect on 1 June 1973. The agreement depended on the
gradual elimination of trade obstacles for industrial and agricultural products
between Cyprus and the EC. The elimination of customs and other restrictions on
trade would lead to a customs union after a ten-year transitional period, which was
divided into two stages. The first would be completed by June 1977 and the second
by 1982. After the first stage, a protocol for the implementation of the second stage
of the Association Agreement would be signed in 1987, which laid down the terms
for the gradual establishment of a customs union31.
Before the Greek Cypriot side's application to the European Community (EC)
for the full membership of the island in 1990, the attitude of the members of the EC
was to give the priority to the solution of the existing Cyprus problem. In this
respect, the entry of Cyprus into the community would not be taken into the agenda,
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unless a solution would be found. However, as of July 1990, the Greek Cypriot side,
which regarded itself as the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" applied EU for
membership by ignoring the reality that Cyprus is a two-community island.
Three years later, on 30 June 1993, the European Commission issued its
opinion on Cyprus's application, "confirming the island's European character and
vocation and concluding that it was eligible to be part of the EU….[Besides],
including a provision that the solution of the Cyprus problem was a precondition to
membership"32. The EU started negotiations with the "Government of the Republic
of Cyprus", which had been recognised as the representative of the whole of Cyprus
by a decision of the UN Security Council in 196433.
Although for many years the EU had pursued a non-involvement policy into
the Cyprus dispute, in the last few years its involvement began to increase. The
European Council meeting at Corfu, under the Greek presidency, in June 1994,
concluded that "an essential stage in Cyprus's preparations for accession could be
regarded as completed and that the next phase of enlargement of the EU will include
Cyprus and Malta"34. This implied that the EU has been in the process of taking on a
special role in the Cyprus question since Cyprus was put on an equal footing as a
membership candidate with the central and east European states in this Council.
The decision was also confirmed by the European Council meetings at Essen
in December 1994 and at Cannes in June 1995. Under the German Presidency in
Essen, the heads of EU states used "much stronger rhetoric in committing themselves
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to the enlargement process with states of Central and Eastern Europe, where they
talked of 'moral obligation'35.
At Cannes, it was also reaffirmed that "accession negotiations [with Malta
and Cyprus] would start within six months after the completion of the [European
Union] Inter-governmental Conference of 1996"36.
At the European Council meeting at Madrid in December 1995, it was
decided that Cyprus and Malta, together with the associated countries of central and
eastern Europe, "will be briefed regularly on the progress of discussions [at the Inter-
governmental Conference] and will be able to put their points of view at meetings
with the Presidency of the European Union"37. The distinction between Cyprus'
application and those from the East is preserved "in the formula of 10+1 in the
Commission's Agenda 2000 of 1997, and in the Council's opening of negotiations in
March 1998 with the first wave of five states from the Central and Eastern Europe,
plus Cyprus"38.
The enlargement process of the EU began with the Luxembourg Summit of
December 1997, at which the Greek part of Cyprus was included within this process,
whereas Turkey was eliminated. Following the decisions taken in the European
Council held in Luxembourg in 1997, the EU started formal accession negotiations
with the Republic of Cyprus on March 31, 1998. At its December 1999 Council in
Helsinki, it "reaffirmed its readiness to accept Cyprus…as a member state without a
prior settlement of the Cyprus problem"39.
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In general, the EU is officially as well as publicly supporting all the UN
Security Council Resolutions as well as the mission of good-offices of the UN
Secretary-General aimed at finding a reasonable, peaceful and mutually acceptable
solution to the Cyprus problem. EU countries hope that the accession negotiations
with Cyprus "may well act as a catalyst for a comprehensive settlement and give the
Turkish Cypriot side an incentive to be more flexible"40.
For the EU, the basis for a settlement in Cyprus should base on a bi-
communal and bi-zonal federation; and its position on the guarantorship is the
withdrawal of Turkish forces and deployment of a UN Multi-National force for the
maintenance of peace and order in the island. Parallel to this, it supports the complete
demilitarisation of the island similar to that of the US position. When "three
freedoms" are concerned, the EU supports the freedom of movement and of
settlement in the case of an agreement. It supports the proportion of 25% to 75%,
when territorial adjustment is at issue.
3.3 Greece (and the Greek Cypriot Community)
From the very beginning, the Greece's Cyprus policy can be explained only
by enosis, which is part of the Megali Idea. Greeks and the Greek Cypriots generally
perceive Cyprus as a Greek island, which can be seen in the words of Archbishop
Makarios in 1971. He said, "Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of
history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek
and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to
Greece"41.
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Being one of the motherlands, Greece continuously supports the Greek
Cypriot side in every international platform, including the European Union. As a
member of the EU, Greece is frequently using its influence to shape the Union's
Cyprus policy and trying to promote Greek Cypriot membership of the European
Union. In order to guarantee the Greek Cypriot accession to the European Union,
Greece, first of all, agreed to lift its veto on the establishment of a customs union
agreement between Turkey and the European Union in return for the promise that
Cyprus' accession discussions would begin six months after the EU Inter-
governmental Conference. Secondly, it threatened to use its veto against the
European Union's project of expanding towards the east, if the Union declined to
accept the Greek Cypriots as a member. As a result, at the Corfu Summit of 1994,
Greece used its presidency as well as its veto power to persuade European Council to
include Cyprus in the following phase of the enlargement of the Union42. "It is
ridiculous", says former Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, "to suppose
that Greece will not use its veto if EU countries veto Cyprus' entry"43.
The reason behind the ambition of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots for EU
membership can be explained in terms of political and security reasons rather than
economic ones. The Greek Cypriots hope that "EU pressure will prove more
effective than previous UN efforts in facilitating the reunification of the island in a
manner broadly consistent with Greek Cypriot objectives: the creation of a federal,
bi-zonal republic under a single sovereignty - different from the rather loose
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confederation of two (essentially) sovereign entities sought by the Turkish Cypriot
leadership"44.
As it was observed by Heinz Kramer, "the EU seems to be driven more by
Greek pressure and reactions to events than by a well-defined Cyprus policy of its
own"45. Therefore, this has obviously raised Greek and Greek Cypriot expectations
that they will succeed in their plans for determining the political future of the island,
and EU membership seems to appear "…for them…[as a] clever way to implement
the basic freedoms of the acquis communautaire"46. Since then, Greece is trying to
get what it wants, concerning Cyprus, from Turkey through EU, and they put all their
hopes in the EU to solve the Cyprus Dispute.
Any country that seeks membership in the EU must meet several conditions
and criteria. Among these are European identity, democratic institutions, respect for
human rights, open-market economy, satisfactory level of economic development,
and the ability to adopt the acquis communautaire, including the Maastricht Treaty47.
The acquis communautaire has three basic principles, namely the freedom of
movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to own property. These are the
principles that could not be negotiable by the member countries; and once a country
becomes a member of the EU, then it will have to observe those principles. When the
Cyprus dispute is concerned, if the Greek Cypriot side becomes a member of the EU,
then it can no longer be possible to talk about bi-zonality and bi-communality, since
they are against the nature of acquis.
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As a political system, Greece, like Greek Cypriot side, prefers a bi-communal
and bi-zonal federal arrangement for Cyprus, where the constituent states have very
limited powers; while there will be a strong federal (central) system48. However,
their concept of federation is quite different from the one, which was supported by
the Turkish side for many years. Both sides "differed on the means of achieving a
federation: Greek Cypriots want their legitimate internationally recognised national
government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then join a
Cypriot republic. The Turkish Cypriots believe that two legitimate entities would
join, for the first time, in a new federation"49.
A future solution to the Cyprus problem is described by George A.
Papandreou, minister for foreign affairs of Greece, as "[a] solution based on UN
resolutions for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with one international personality,
one citizenship and one sovereignty"50. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of
"an independent country with a maximum degree of internal self-administration, no
foreign troops on its soil, and international security guarantees for both the Greek
and Turkish Cypriot communities"51.
Greeks and the Greek Cypriot side rejected the confederation proposal, which
was supported by the Turkish side, since they think that this acceptance would imply
the international recognition of the TRNC as a state and such a development would
lead to the division of the island.
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3.4 Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriot Community)
Turkey, having historical, cultural and ethnic ties with Cyprus, has been
increasingly involved in the Cypriot matters since the beginning of the Cyprus
problem52. "In addition to [Turkey's] responsibility towards the fate of people of
Turkish origin on the island of Cyprus, in view of her vital interests Turkey would
never allow solutions that would keep the door ajar for enosis"53.
Until the mid-1997, Turkey placed priority on the security as well as well-
being of the Turkish Cypriots. Since 1997, the strategic importance of the island for
Turkey adds new dimensions for Turkey's active involvement of the issue. Therefore,
it has begun to emphasise that Cyprus is a security concern in its own right as well54.
One of the reasons behind this policy may be the S-300 missile crisis between
Turkey and the Greek Cypriot administration of Cyprus. The tension, caused by the
Greek Cypriots' insistence on signing the contract to purchase the anti-aircraft
missile system from the Russian Federation, was escalated by the decision on the
installation of this system in the south of the island. For Turkey, the deployment of
this missile system would upset the military balance in the Mediterranean. For this
reason Turkey decided firmly to take all the necessary measures, even to use force, if
the Greek side insisted on deploying the S-300 missiles, which would certainly
deepen the crisis of confidence on the island. Turkey warned "the deployment of the
missiles would turn the current political impasse on the island into a regional military
conflict"55. At the end, those weapons were kept out of Cyprus and they were
deployed in Crete instead.
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Turkey believes that Greece aims to envelop Turkey with a "strategic belt
from the island of Lemnos opposite the Dardanelles all the way to the Bay of
İskenderun and bring all supply routes leading to Anatolia under her control"56.
Therefore, the presence of the Turkish troops in Cyprus is an effective deterrence
against Greece when Turkey's security is concerned. A "Greek Cyprus" would
directly threaten Turkey's security as well as its vital interests, especially along
Turkey's Mediterranean coastline. This area will become even more important once
the pipelines from the Caspian Basin to Ceyhan materialise57. The "close proximity"
of Cyprus to Turkey implies that in the face of a sophisticated arms build-up by the
Greek Cypriots, Turkey may become so vulnerable against the actions of the Greek
Cypriots. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot importations of missiles aim to "neutralise
Turkish air supremacy" in the region which may disturb Turkey's security as well as
rights in Cyprus. In addition, Cyprus is becoming an arena for many other power-
struggles, all of which have significant implications for Turkish interests58.
When the future political system of Cyprus is concerned, the position of the
Turkish Cypriots; and therefore Turkey can be explained as "two sovereign states" or
a bi-zonal, bi-communal "confederation" of two sovereign states, which was
explained in the previous chapter, under the title of Turkish Cypriot Proposal of
Confederation. Turkish position was presented by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in
1999 at the UN that "[a] just and lasting compromise in Cyprus today can only be
based upon the existing realities. There are two separate peoples, two separate states
in Cyprus"59.
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Turkey supports a very weak central system, in which each state is having
extensive powers, and also it claims that separate sovereignty should be granted for
each community based on the right of self-determination. Unlike the Greek view,
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side insist on the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee including the unilateral intervention right of Turkey.
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side was highly opposed to Greek Cypriot
side's unilateral and unlawful application to the EU for membership, since this
application is illegal due to the Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee60, which
prohibited any political or economic union of the Republic of Cyprus, in whole or in
part, with any state. Moreover, as it was also stated by the Zurich and London
agreements, which are part of the international treaties establishing the 1960
Settlement, Cyprus can not join international political and economic unions to which
Turkey and Greece are not members61. This view is also confirmed by Professor M.
Mendelson62, a well-known international jurist, who "raised…element of illegality
on the application of the membership and argued that 'the Greek Cypriot
administration is not entitled in international law to apply to join…the EU while
Turkey is not a member'63.
This unilateral application of the Greek Cypriots was highly opposed by the
Turkish Cypriots, since the 1960 settlement was come into being by the equal
participation of the two communities. This historical fact was underlined by the
British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd on 19 December 1956:
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It will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that
any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a
manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek
Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus,
be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In
other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise
of self-determination in such a mixed population must include
partition among the eventual options64.
The EU membership of the "Republic of Cyprus" was also underlined by the
UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in the Set of Ideas. The paragraph 92
of the Set of Ideas which reads: "Matters related to the membership of the federal
republic in the European Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and
will be submitted to the approval of the two communities in two separate
referenda"65.
The decisions taken in Luxembourg concerning Cyprus destroyed all the
parameters, which were evolved for a federal settlement throughout years under the
mission of good offices of the Secretary-General and also the basis of the inter-
communal talks, which have been going on for 25 years. The decisions taken not
only ignored the equal and sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots, but also put
them into a position as if they were only one of a religious group in Cyprus. The EU
attitude towards the Greek Cypriot side raised the Greek expectations and, therefore,
encouraged them to pursue a dangerous policy.
In response to EU's decision to open accession negotiations with the Greek
Cypriot side, Turkey has taken steps to be integrated with the TRNC66. Within the
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framework of this declared desire, Turkey and TRNC issued a joint statement in July
1997 expressing their determination to protect the sovereign equality, rights and
freedoms of the Turkish Cypriot people as well as strengthen cooperation. The
declaration called for:
The establishment of an Association Council; the creation of an
economic and financial union between the two states; the inclusion
of the TRNC in Turkey's regional development master plan; the
improvement of transportation links between Turkey and the
TRNC; and the development of a joint defence concept between
Turkey and the TRNC. Turkey has also begun to include Turkish
Cypriots in Turkish delegations and missions abroad67.
In addition to this, a significant change took place in the Turkish view.
Turkey, therefore the Turkish Cypriot side, have moved away from the idea of bi-
zonal and bi-communal federation to a new one; that is the recognition of the
existence of two separate states in the island as a basis for any future solution. Until
EU involvement into the Cyprus matter, Turkish side supported the idea of bi-zonal
and bi-communal federation as a solution to the issue. However, the decision on
Cyprus' involvement into the enlargement process by ignoring the existence of the
Turkish Cypriot side, changed all the existing parameters and principles that have
evolved through negotiations over the years.
The objection raised by the Turkish side does not imply that TRNC is
opposed to EU membership, but it believes that only after a final political settlement,
where the two sides equally accepted, then membership will become a possibility.
Furthermore, the Turkish side believed that the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot
application would rapidly Hellenise the Turkish side of the island, and would make
the Turkish Cypriots second-class citizens. Moreover, the Turkish community still
thinks that the other side of the island has not yet given up the goal of enosis. The
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Turks also fear the possibility of a  "quasi-enosis", since if the Greek Cypriot
application for the EU membership is accepted, then the island will be integrated
with the EU states, including Greece68.
When the Cyprus problem is concerned, Turkey demands the respect for
some primary principles, which will enable the Turkish Cypriot population to live as
free peoples and in security in their own homeland. Furthermore, "the so-called
three-freedoms [freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to own
property] to be regulated and applied in such a way as to ensure that the security of
the Turkish Cypriot people is not endangered in any way"69. First of all, bi-zonality is
considered as the must requirement of any future settlement, which will provide the
security of the Turkish Cypriot people. Secondly, the equal political status of two
parties is necessary for any arrangement. Therefore, the existence of the TRNC
should be internationally recognised in order to provide the principle of equality in
the case of Cyprus. Otherwise, it can not be possible to prepare the ground for any
fair and long-lasting settlement, if one party is granted the status of a "state", and the
other is only a "community".
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CHAPTER IV
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE CYPRUS QUESTION
Cyprus issue is not basically a problem only between the two communities of
the island, but also becomes a problem of Greece and Turkey as well as the
international community, which was already mentioned in the previous chapters.
Recently, Turkey has claimed that Cyprus constitutes a significant issue in Turkey's
strategic interests, whereas Greece puts the settlement of the Cyprus problem as a
prerequisite for the settlement of other Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean, and
threaten that without progress on Cyprus, there will be no progress on the problems,
which are waiting for solution between Greece and Turkey.
All these disputes between Greece and Turkey have deep roots in history, and
go as far back as the conquest of Constantinople (İstanbul), the capital of the
Byzantine Empire, by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Two American researchers, Vamık
Volkan, of Turkish Cypriot origin, and Norman Itzkowitz, believe that the conquest
has caused a deep trauma among the Greeks and other Christians, which is still
continuing1. International community, on the other hand, seems to seek a solution
which is possibly serving their interests and seems to ignore the needs of the two
communities.
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Greece and Turkey have had a number of wars, especially from 1821, when
the Greeks gained their independence from the Ottoman, to 1922 when they were
defeated by the Turks during Turkish War of Independence. This frequency of wars
creates a sense of insecurity as well as lack of trust towards each other2. In that sense,
history plays an important role in the process of non-settlement of the Cyprus dispute,
and each party viewed the past differently. "Parties own historical descriptions
of…conflicts [which] are loaded with diametrically different interpretations of the
past and future"3. For Clement Dodd, "[a]nimosities are also historical and
psychological in origin and are more pronounced among Greeks than Turks"4. This
fact is also emphasised by the American emissary, Richard Holbrooke during his visit
to Nicosia in late 1997. He stated that "when I try to talk about the future, the people
here, the leaders talk about the past"5.
Greece and Turkey are naturally involved in the Cyprus issue, since they are
the two mainland countries that the two peoples of Cyprus identify themselves with.
The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots see themselves, respectively, as parts of
the Hellenic and Turkish nations, and they identify themselves as Greeks and Turks
instead of a separate Cypriot identity. Besides Greece and Turkey, the external actors,
namely the United States and the European Union, become parties to the issue, due to
the strategic position of the island. With the involvement of the USA, the EU, Greece
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and Turkey, the Cyprus problem lost its national character and became an
international one as well.
4.1 What Makes The Two Communities Live Separately From Each
Other?
Ethnic conflicts often lead to a "vicious cycle" in which each side views the
other side's actions as hostile. Furthermore, there is always a tendency to view the
other side's movements as having the purpose of destroying "one's own national
existence"6. For example, the Greek Cypriots view the close relations between the
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as having a hostile purpose. On the other hand, the
Turkish Cypriots believe that the Greek Cypriots still aim at achieving enosis in
Cyprus in the long run.
Both parties tend to see the matters differently, and "continue to take an
assertive and determined stance in relations with one another, a stance that sometimes
is not free from belligerence"7. On the part of the Turkish Cypriots, they do not trust
the Greek Cypriots, due to the way they were treated between 1963 and 1974, and
these memories shape their vision of the future. On the part of the Greek Cypriots,
they believe that a foreign state, Turkey, has invaded their island and deprived many
of them of their homes. This injury shapes their vision of the future, like the Turkish
Cypriot people8. They see Turkey merely as an "invader" and called the Turkish
Cypriot leadership as "puppets", controlled by the Ankara Government.
Besides, there are serious differences between these two peoples that make it
difficult for them to live closely with each other. Since 1964, these two peoples have
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been living separately. Moreover, in their relations with each other, there exists a
history of conflict as well as a serious confidence crisis. Therefore, in such
circumstances, it is difficult to merge them under one formula.
The most important difference is that of nationalism. The Greek Cypriots wish
to have enosis (the union with Greece) until recently, whereas the Turkish Cypriots
highly oppose it and they wish taksim (partition of the island between the
communities) instead.
The second difference is that of allegiance. Each of the communities is more
loyal to Greece or Turkey than to Cyprus, and each considers Greece or Turkey as
their mother country. In the words of George Kaloudis "[t]he Cypriots do not seem to
be able to isolate themselves from Greece and Turkey, the outcome of which is the
absence of patriotism in Cyprus"9.
Another important difference is that of ethnic origin. Each community has
been influenced by the customs, traditions and values of its mother country, which
prevent the emergence of a separate Cypriot identity. Each community is the follower
of its mother country10.
4.2 The Success of a Federal System in the Case of Cyprus
It is generally believed that federalism, as a state system, seems the best way
to manage peoples of different ethnic origins, since it is based on the will of the
people involved. It "offers a balance between unity for common purposes and
separation for ethnic or other local reasons. People living in a federation are generally
torn between the feeling that they want to go and the feeling that they want to stay.
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These dual feelings should be supported by a constitution and institutions"11.
However, many federations, namely Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia and Mali, have
failed despite the high hopes of their creators. These examples bring to mind the
question of the appropriateness of a federal union as a form of governance in multi-
ethnic societies, such as that of Cyprus12.
Many factors should be taken into account, when a federal system is
discussed. First of all, there should be a real desire to create a federal entity. In the
case of Cyprus, both parties agreed on a federal system in many occasions, but they
were talking about different forms of federations and their definitions differed in
many aspects, which were discussed in the second chapter of this study. Secondly, "a
successful federation required mutual sympathy among the populations involved,
some mutual need, and the assurance that one unit will not dominate the others"13.
However, this could not be attainable in the case of Cyprus where there is an insistent
desire for enosis on the part of the Greek Cypriot side, while the Turkish Cypriot side
could not really accept being dominated by the Greek Cypriots.
Thirdly, the issue of sovereignty is of critical importance in the case of
Cyprus. If the idea of a single federal state is more or less agreed by the parties to the
dispute, then there may possibly appear a considerable problem as to what powers the
central government of the new state should have. If a federal settlement is agreed as a
solution, the Greek Cypriots may insist that the central government should have
considerable powers over the federated states, whereas the Turkish Cypriots insist on
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a solution, where the powers of the government will reside in the federal states
themselves14.
Fourthly, the commitment and good will of the constituent parties are the most
important determinants for the maintenance of federalism. With their existence,
federal spirit and federal behaviour could develop over time15. In the case of Cyprus,
however, there is mistrust and fear between the two communities. Furthermore, there
is no psychological condition, which would provide unity among the two
communities. Those psychological conditions could emerge in the long run, but not
immediately even if a federal constitution is written. The success of a federal system
depends on the degree of tolerance and compromise among the leaders as well as the
peoples of Cyprus. As long as cooperation and consensus could not be achieved, the
viability and success of a federation will be in doubt16.
4.3 Is Confederation A Viable Solution For Cyprus?
The Turkish Cypriot side claims that a confederal arrangement between the
two parties could provide for the satisfaction of the needs and interests in the case of
Cyprus, where there is a history of conflict and mistrust between the parties.
Therefore, in such circumstances, a confederal settlement offers the best formula
which can provide for both a politically secure environment and at the same time lead
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to cooperative relationship between the two equal and as well as sovereign parties in
Cyprus for the following reasons17:
▬ The parties to the Cyprus problem attach great importance to their separate
national identities and they are highly insistent on their respective sovereignties.
One of the main problems in the Cyprus dispute is, therefore, to connect these two
politically sovereign identities.
First of all, in federations, territorial sovereignty is often shared or transferred to
the federation. Whereas in confederations, constituent states could retain their
sovereignty.
Secondly, federations aim at nation-building while confederations aim at uniting
politically sovereign states, without depriving them of their statehood, and they
enable states to preserve their territorial sovereignty as well. Thus single
citizenship is usually not the norm in confederations.
According to Daniel Elazar, "[t]oday, confederations are often used where the
separate ethnic or national loyalties of the constituent states are very strong and
their people wish to preserve them, but at the same time see the advantage of long-
term or permanent links with other states and peoples"18.
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▬ In the case of Cyprus, structural equality and symmetry constitute primary
elements for both parties. Since the Greek Cypriot administration is
internationally recognised as the legitimate government of the whole of Cyprus,
an equal treatment is necessitated for the Turkish Cypriot State, TRNC, as well.
Confederal arrangements provide the best model for partnership, since such
systems do not deprive any party from its sovereign equality and statehood, by
providing symmetry and equality.
▬ TRNC is composed of people, who are secular Muslims and Turkish speaking,
while the Greek Cypriot administration is composed of people, who are Orthodox
Christian and Greek speaking. In the case of Cyprus, it can not be possible to talk
about a separate Cypriot Nation, but there exists two different national
communities.
Federations serve single nations where the federal government has direct contact
with the people. On the other hand, confederations composed of different national
states, where the confederation must reach the peoples of the constituent states
through the governments of those states.
Confederations apply best in situations "where the populations are too
heterogeneous to form viable federal-type unions. Primary loyalty in
confederations is oriented toward the constituent states"19.
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▬ The island of Cyprus is the home of both Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots. Therefore, neither side has the right to rule the other nor the right to be
the government of the other. Both parties have equal right to decide on the future
of the island. They share the common future that they should cooperate and they
should work together.
Confederations enable peoples to work for common political and security
interests.
▬ In the case of Cyprus, the problem is the lack of trust between the parties, and a
minimal degree of cooperation.
Confederal structures leave most governmental powers to its member states to be
exercised.
▬ The security, strategic and economic interests of both powers in the island, their
respective motherlands and the transatlantic interests in general are threatened by
the conflict in Cyprus. Therefore, "[t]he re-establishment of balance of power on
the island through a confederal arrangement based on the sovereign equality and
statehood of the two parties will provide for island-wide and regional security and
stability"20.
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▬ Both parties in Cyprus wish to become members of the EU. "A confederal
arrangement can provide the mechanisms and the common roof which, in turn,
can facilitate joint membership of the EU"21.
▬ The existing regime forms of the two parties in Cyprus are different.
In federations, all the regimes must be similar in form, whereas confederations can
have a greater range of regime forms among their constituent states.
▬ It is highly likely that both parties in Cyprus will want to maintain a high degree
of independent access to the international arena if they managed to establish a
confederation.
Confederations have a higher degree of independent access to the international
arena.
▬ The Turkish Cypriot people of Cyprus do not want to engage in another
constitutional arrangement with their former partner, the Greek Cypriot side, since
they do not want to return to the days that they had experienced at the hands of the
Greek Cypriots between 1964 and 1974. In such circumstances, confederal
arrangement seems like the best solution for the Turkish Cypriots, since it is
formed by an agreement or a treaty between constituting states and the agreement
or treaty becomes their basic document. Whereas the basic legal document of
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federations is a constitution, which the Turkish Cypriots do not want to conclude
with their Greek Cypriot partners again.
The Turkish Cypriots insist on the establishment of a confederal system in
Cyprus, since this settlement will provide the opportunity for the constituent states to
establish their own ties with other countries as well as institutions. For instance, if the
Turkish Cypriot State wish to maintain special relations with Turkey, then it would
have the chance to do it under a confederal system. The same is also applicable
between Greek Cypriots and Greece.
In early 2000, Centre for European Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, sponsored an
independent study to address the "Cyprus Issue". Nathalie Tocci prepared a report
entitled "The Cyprus Question: Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests
within a Wider European Framework". In this report, she stated that a solution based
on a unitary sovereign state had failed in 1963 and would have been likely to do so
today. It is therefore necessary to propose a settlement, which is desirable by the
parties as well as viable in terms of an agreement. She also suggested that "as a first
step, a confederal arrangement for Cyprus, which would not evolve into two separate
states, but would evolve into a tighter federation through growing integration and
experience of joint governance"22, should be implemented. She concluded by stating
that such a solution would not only be a viable option for the Turkish Cypriot side,
but also offer two gains for the Turkish Cypriots. First, they would retain control over
their state and gain international recognition. Secondly, this arrangement would offer
economic gains to the Turkish Cypriots.
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4.4 The Main Challenges to be Faced in the Search for a Solution
The mutual suspicion prevalent among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots is one of the most important reasons that both parties have been neither
willing nor able to agree on a settlement in Cyprus23. The main challenges to be faced
in the search for solutions are emotional as much as political. The emotional challenge
can only be described by the word "fear". The years-old partition of Cyprus has left
the two communities with limited contact and communication with each other, which
nourished the feeling of fear. This fear derives from the memory of past atrocities,
which is still very vivid in the minds of people on both sides, and "the island is also
divided in the minds of people" is a common comment among the islanders in
Cyprus24.
Furthermore, the absence of contact and communication has led each of the
two communities to perceive the other as a stranger. Fear, combined with a strong
distrust, which has deep roots in history, seems seriously complicate the search for a
political solution mutually acceptable to both sides. On both sides, it was a common
comment that the passage of time did not help to reduce these difficulties25.
4.5 The Realities of Cyprus
In Cyprus, there exist two sovereign and equal peoples having the equal rights
of self-determination. There exist two independent states, namely the TRNC and the
Greek Cypriot State in southern Cyprus, which fulfil all the necessities of statehood
recognised by international law for the political existence of states. It seems that
international recognition of the TRNC, and the lifting of Greek Cypriot embargos
                                                          
23 Christopher de Bellaigue, "Conciliation in Cyprus?," Washington Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Spring 99):
185.
24 http://www.ipu.org/cypr-e/missn94.htm Mission 94.
25 ibid.
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against the TRNC, should be required in order to have successful negotiations for the
settlement of the Cyprus dispute.
Moreover, as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, their physical security
should be guaranteed. Given the failure of the UN to protect them between 1964 and
1974, they feel that only Turkey could provide the sort of security they needed.
Otherwise, "[i]n feeling insecure, each side will often act in ways that will lead the
other side to feel insecure as well"26.
According to George Kaloudis "[a]s long as the Greeks, the Turks and the
[international actors] do not view Cyprus as an independent country but rather as a
disputed problem between Greece and Turkey, the possibility of settling the dispute is
very small"27. Therefore, in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem, the
interests of all Cypriots should be given priority.
The parties should not be forced to agree on a future plan, since such
enforcement might result in a situation worse than the existing one. Demetrios
Theophylactou, who is of the same opinion with George Kaloudis stressed that:
Whatever compromise solution might someday be achieved, it is
likely to be viable only if it is a result of inter-communal consent
and calls for the exclusion of future external interference,
however unlikely this may seem. In the final analysis, the Cyprus
question must be solved by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
themselves, without outside interference 28.
The process, which could be followed by the parties, in order to settle the
Cyprus problem, is to develop an outline for an overall agreement. This may lead to a
positive change in the atmosphere of the island, if this can be achieved. Then,
                                                          
26 Jay Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus," 106.
27 George Kaloudis, "Cyprus: The enduring conflict," 17.
28 Demetrios A. Theophylactou, "A 'German Solution' for Cyprus's Reunification or United Nations
'Enforcement' of Peace?," Mediterranean Quarterly 6, no. 3, (Summer 1995): 43.
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negotiations between the two communities will become possible. Obviously, an
outline could not provide the final solutions to the problems, but it may produce ways
to resolve them within determined parameters. This outline, first of all, should respect
to the basic principles of political equality and partnership, bi-zonality and bi-
communality, which were already defined by the UN Secretariat as a basis for future
negotiations. Moreover, one should not forget the reality that Cyprus as an island is
the home of the two communities and the relationship between these two communities
was not one of a majority and minority, which has already mentioned by the UN
Secretary-General. Furthermore, an overall agreement should safeguard the identity,
integrity and security of each community, which is a core issue in Cyprus settlement.
The political or economic domination of one community by the other should not be
permitted as well. If those mentioned conditions are provided in the case of Cyprus,
then this may lead to a viable as well as mutually acceptable settlement in the island.
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CONCLUSION
The question of Cyprus remained unsettled, despite of a long history of
negotiations, since both sides see the matters in different perspectives. Even the
concept of equality varies from one party to the other that each interprets it
differently. "Equality, for one side, does not imply equal numerical participation in
all the branches of the …government. For the other side, equality means identical
participation and identical powers. This is the main stumbling block on the way to a
settlement"1. The Greek Cypriots believe that the size of the population is a crucial
factor for the achievement of any union, whereas for the Turkish Cypriots equality
should prevail, since each party will constitute the new arrangement independently of
its size2. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots have a deep distrust of the Greek
Cypriots due to the 1963 events, which aimed at the total annihilation of the Turkish
Cypriot community. For them, the crucial point in the dispute was Security Council
resolution 186 of March 1964, which recognised the Greek Cypriots as the sole
representative of the whole island. In the words of Clement Dodd, "[o]ne of the
reasons, perhaps the principal reason, for the Cyprus dispute is each side's intense
historical memory and conviction that history has done it an injustice. It is not the
record of history that is so important as the elements of it that each side accentuates
to justify its own present position"3. Besides, each side is supported by its mother
country, which adds a new dimension to the problem. As motherlands, Greece and
Turkey naturally became parties to the dispute, and unfortunately their unresolved
                                                          
1 Hugo J. Gobbi, Rethinking Cyprus,  (Tel Aviv: Editorial Aurora, 1993), 33.
2 ibid., 22.
3 Clement H. Dodd, " A Historical Overview," Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, Clement H.
Dodd (ed.), (Huntington: The Eothen Press, 1999): 1.
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disputes4 concerning the Aegean lead to the deterioration of the existing situation in
the island.
The lack of settlement in the Cyprus issue constitutes a potential threat to
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean; and as long as it remained unsettled, there has
always been a danger of escalation of events in the region between Greece and
Turkey, which may have widespread repercussions and undesirable consequences
from which no one would benefit5. Therefore, a timely and viable resolution of the
Cyprus problem is a necessity of the security throughout the Mediterranean, since
"[t]he Eastern Mediterranean is located at the centre of a volatile regional triangle
comprising South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Given that
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is impossible without a viable Cyprus solution,
NATO's broad strategic interests are linked to a sustainable peace in Cyprus"6.
In terms of preparing the ground for resolving the Cyprus conflict, some ideas
are put forward by international experts. According to Prof. William Zartman, "[if]
we are going to transform a conflict, we need a situation which…[is] mutually
hurting stalemate"7. By this he implies that all the parties should equally be hurt from
the existing status quo. If they are not equally hurt and instead one of them benefits
from the existing status quo, then the "dynamics for change" can not be said to exist.
However, in the case of Cyprus, there is still applied discrimination among the two
communities that the Greek Cypriot regime is internationally accepted as the
                                                          
4 Those problems are the following: the width of territorial waters; delimitation of the continental
shelf; airspace; militarisation of Eastern Aegean islands by Greece; lack of any agreement with Greece
to determine maritime boundaries; problems concerning islets and rocks in the Aegean. In addition to
these, the problem of Turkish minorities in the Western Thrace and Cyprus add new dimension to the
problems between Greece and Turkey.
5 Stephen Larrabee, "The EU Needs to Rethink its Cyprus Policy," Survival 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998):
25.
6 Elizabeth H. Prodromou, "Reintegrating Cyprus: The Need for a New Approach,"Survival 40, no. 3
(Autumn 1998): 6.
7 It is cited in Ergun Olgun, "Turkish Cypriot view: A Confederation for the 'Island of Cyprus'.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grups/ad/add/cyprus.ceris6.htm, Turkish MFA.
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government of Cyprus, whereas the right of the Turkish Cypriots to establish their
own state is totally ignored or refused. As long as the Greek Cypriot side is treated as
the government of the whole Cyprus, no settlement can be possible, because the
Greek Cypriot leadership is encouraged by all the diplomatic and economic benefits
of political recognition. Therefore they have no intention and will to share power
with the Turkish Cypriot side on the basis of political equality, and no will to
compromise, since they are "benefiting from the status quo"8. This constitutes the
main impediment, which prevented a reasonable solution to the Cyprus problem.
Moreover, "the Greek Cypriot side has not abandoned its enosis (union with Greece)
psychology, which regards Cyprus as nothing less than a 'Greek Island'- certainly
nothing in which their Turkish Cypriot neighbours could have a share"9.
Concerning the Cyprus Problem, the question is how to guarantee the
integrity and sovereignty of each party, as well as to link the two states of Cyprus
under one formula10. A future formula should provide the maintenance of the balance
between the two motherlands vis-à-vis Cyprus, which is essential for peace in the
region as well as guaranteeing the integrity and sovereign equality of the two
communities of the island. However, under those circumstances, where both parties
have different prospects of solution for a reasonable settlement of the Cyprus
problem, it is quite difficult to meet at a midpoint to reconcile them. Many of the
Greek Cypriots regard the island as historically theirs, whereas the Turkish Cypriots
believe that they have as much right to be there as the Greek Cypriots.
                                                          
8 It is cited in Ergun Olgun, "Turkish Cypriot view: A Confederation for the 'Island of Cyprus'.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grups/ad/add/cyprus.ceris6.htm, Turkish MFA.
9 See Turhan Feyzioglu, The Crux of the Cyprus Question (Lefkoşa, 1987), 46.
10 Ergün Olgun, "Why Confederation for Cyprus," Conference on Confederal Structure: A Time For A
New Look For Cyprus (4-5 March 2000): 6-7.
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Since Cyprus is clearly divided into two in terms of culture, religion,
language and origin, it can not be possible to talk about a single Cypriot identity and
consciousness. The two communities of the island perceive each other as "we" and
"they" which possibly prevent them from producing positive ideas for the settlement
of the decades-long Cyprus problem.
It might be more constructive if outside powers, particularly the United
States, the European Union, Greece and Turkey remain aloof from the affairs of
Cyprus, since their interference might highly complicate the problems facing Cyprus.
Since those parties have different expectations over the issue, and their "multi-faced"
interests, which more or less led to the unsettlement of the dispute. In this respect,
"national interest" is the word which describes states' actions and it is the
determining factor in foreign policies of states.
The problem lies in the fact that whether a federation or a confederation, first
of all the animosity and lack of trust between the two communities should be
eliminated. Otherwise, a long-lasting solution, whether a federation or confederation,
will not be easy to implement. A permanent and mutually acceptable agreement
could only be achieved in Cyprus if it is freely negotiated solely between the two
communities without outside interference.
Consequently, the years-old partition has left the two communities with
limited contact and communication which nourished the feeling of fear and distrust
with each other. Therefore, it may produce dangerous results to force these two
peoples to live under one roof, where there exists a history of conflict as well as a
serious confidence crisis in their relations with each other. Under such
circumstances, confederal settlement seems the viable solution to provide the needs
of the peoples of Cyprus.
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APPENDIX A
Documents Agreed in the French Text and initialled by the Greek
and Turkish Prime Ministers at Zurich on February 11, 1959.
(a) BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President
being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the
Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.
2.The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish.
Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and
promulgated in the two official languages.
3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour,
chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.
Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags
on
holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.
The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and
Turkish national holidays.
4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of 5 years.
in the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the
Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the
House of Representatives respectively.
in the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take
place within a period of not more than 45 days.
The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of
Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the
Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24
hours after its constitution.
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5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For
this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of sever Greek
Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall appoint them by an
instrument signed by them both.
The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.
Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.
Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-
President by publication in the official gazette.
However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and
the right to return the decision of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions
as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.
6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a
period of 5 years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the
proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish
community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data (NB. The
number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the
communities.)
The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those
expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. in the event of a conflict of
authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which
shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the
President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.
7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple
majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither
the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in
Point 9 below.
The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by
a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the
Turkish members of the House of Representatives.
Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the
municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple
majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking
part in the vote and considered separately.
On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise
their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment any
question of discrimination arises. if the House maintains its decisions, the President
and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional
Court.
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8. The Presidentent and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the
right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the
participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of
alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate or concerning defense and
security as defined in Annex I.
9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and
conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the
House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for
reconsideration.
The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so
returned. if the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and
the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-
limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.
Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to
discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the
Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or
return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The
law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or,
where it has been returned the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.
10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of
representatives which it shall itself determine.
The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on
members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies
and institutions under their supervision.
The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational,
cultural and teaching questions, and questions of personal status. They shall exercise
authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal
nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations,
producers and consumers, co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the
purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (NB. it is understood
that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to
prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire
them.)
These producers and consumers co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall
be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of
the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in
matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only.
These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be
supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.
Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the
institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding
paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by
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officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment, or
municipality in question.
11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per
cent of Turks.
it is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in
all grades of the Civil Service.
in regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority
approaching 100 per cent, the organs of the local administration shall be composed
solely of officials belonging to that community.
12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the inspector-General, the
Treasurer and the Governor of the issuing Bank may not belong to the same
community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.
13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the
Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic
acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs
to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.
14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of when 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40
per cent Turkish.
The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men,
which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the
Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks
and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be
raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per
cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart
from the auxiliary police.
15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a
proportion approaching 100 per cent, by members of a single community, shall
belong to that community.
16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks,
one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President
of the Republic.
The President of Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.
This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments,
promotions of judges, etc.).
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17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same
community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that
community. if the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the
composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court
of Justice.
Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to
religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers
under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community
concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined
according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the
law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.
in criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same
community as the accused. if the injured party belongs to another community, the
composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court
of Justice.
18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to
exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who
are condemned to death. in cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are
members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by
agreement between the President and the Vice-President. in the event of
disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death
penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.
19. in the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons
who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.
Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on
payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals.
in appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.
Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation
was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.
20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the
Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:
 (a) in each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise
work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters
which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two
members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish
municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.
 (b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within 4 years the question
whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall
continue.
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With regard to the localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution
of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional
representation for the two communities.
21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of
the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece,
the United Kingdom, and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be
concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be
inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)
22. it shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other
State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two
independent States), shall be excluded.
23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great
Britain, Greece, and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.
This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the
United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United
Kingdom.
24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions
for education, culture, athletics, and charity belonging to their respective
communities.
Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of
schoolmasters, professors, or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and
Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their
needs.
25. One of the following Ministries -the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Defense, or the Ministry of Finance- shall be entrusted to a Turk. if the President and
the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.
26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall
be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than 3 months
from the signature of the Treaties.
27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of
Cyprus.
E.A.T. S.L. F.R.Z
Y.A.M. F.K.
Annex I A
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The defense questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as
follows:
(a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
(b) Appointments and promotions.
(c) imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.
(d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.
The security questions subject to veto are as follows.
(a) Appointments and promotions.
(b) Allocation and stationing of forces.
(c) Emergency measures and martial law.
(d) Police laws.
it is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures of decisions,
but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.
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APPENDIX B
TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CYPRUS
(1) TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece
and the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other
part:
Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the
Government of the United Kingdom on the 17th of February, 1959, during the
Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the
Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of
the Greek  Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot
Community and bye the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community;
Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to
this Treaty;
Have agreed as follows;
ARTICLE 1
The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the island of Cyprus, together
with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in
Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri
Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.
ARTICLE 2
 (1) The Republic of Cyprus
 (2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to
ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the
Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full
enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.
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ARTICLE 3
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to
consult and co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 4
The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be
those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 5
The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights
and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in section I of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental signed at Rome on
the 4th of November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on
the 20th of March.
ARTICLE 6
The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment
of the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 7
The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out
the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising
out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus. These arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 8
 (1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the
United Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application
to the Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus.
 (2) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of
the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 9
The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements
concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 10
Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty
shall be settled as follows:
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(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military
requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in
so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or
any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek,
Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the
tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the
authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.
(2) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty
on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military
authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between
the Parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be composed of four
representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United
Kingdom, the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman
nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a
citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus of Greece
or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and, if he also is such a
citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court.
ARTICLE 11
The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 12
This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it.
(2) TREATY OF GUARANTEE
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part.
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the
Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
I. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that
Constitution.
Have agreed as follows.
ARTICLE I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence,
territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.
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It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic
union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity
likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition
of the Island.
ARTICLE II
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the
Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee
the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and
also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as
concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of
Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE III
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the
areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of
the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United
Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance
with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at
Nicosia on to-day's date.
ARTICLE IV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and
the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations
or measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
ARTICLE V
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts
of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of
the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
100
(3) TREATY OF ALLIANCE
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of
them,
II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in
conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defense and
to consult together on the problems raised by that defense.
ARTICLE II
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or
indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic
of Cyprus.
ARTICLE III
For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above,
a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus.
ARTICLE IV
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with
the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No.I annexed to the present
Treaty.
The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of
Cyprus.
ARTICLE V
The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a
period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall
be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE VI
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.
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The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application
of the present Treaty renders them necessary.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration
of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
No. I
I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite
Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned
officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.
II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in
agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce
the Greek and Turkish contingents.
III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish
contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status,
facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities
and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the
organisation and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined
by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of
Alliance.
IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than
three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed. Commission for the
Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of
officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The
Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of
signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
No.II
ARTICLE I
A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece
and Turkey, It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance
and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the
Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.
ARTICLE II
The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session by its Chairman at the
request of one of the members of the Alliance.
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Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
ARTICLE III
The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one
year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless
it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall,
during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of
Ministers, both ordinary and special.
The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be
necessary for the fulfillment of its task.
ARTICLE IV
The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be
responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall
submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a
detailed account of the Headquarters' activities.
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APPENDIX C
THE AKRITAS PLAN
TOP SECRET
FROM HEADQUARTERS
  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
  A. EXTERNAL TACTICS (INTERNATIONAL)
  B. INTERNAL FRONT
                                    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The recent public statements of the Archbishop have prescribed the course
which our national issue will follow in the immediate future. As we have stressed in
the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it
always possible to fix definite time limits for the achievement of the various stages
of their development. Our national cause must always be judged in the light of the
conditions and developments of the moment; the measures which will be taken, the
tactics and the time of implementing each measure is determined by the conditions
existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying
and must pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final
result are many and varied. It must be understood by everyone that each measure
taken is the result of continuous studies and, in the meantime, forms the basis for the
future measures. It must be recognized that the measures which are prescribed now
constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable
national objective, to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-
determination of the people.
Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains to be examined is the
subject of tactics. This must necessarily be separated as internal and external:
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A. EXTERNAL TACTICS (INTERNATIONAL)
During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been
presented to world public opinion and diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise
of the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. In the exercise of this
right, the subject of the Turkish minority was introduced under the well-known
conditions and with argument of violent inter-communal clashes, it had been tried to
make it accepted that co-existence of the two communities under a united
administration was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem
was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which was presented
as the result of negotiations and agreement between the contending parties.
a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the
impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved and the
solution requires revision.
b) First objective was our endeavor to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to
create the impression that:
1. the solution given is neither satisfactory nor fair;
2. the agreement reached was not the result of free and voluntary acceptance of a
compromise of the conflicting views;
3. the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival,
and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;
4. the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
5. the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and
not the Turks.
c) All the above which required very difficult effort, have been archieved to a
satisfactory degree. Most of the diplomatic representatives are already
convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was
signed under pressure and solution has not been ratified by the people, is a
significant argument in this connection, because our leadership, acting wisely,
avoided calling the people to give its official approval to the agreement by a
plebiscite or otherwise, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have
definitely approved. Generally, it has been established that the administration
of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks
was confined to a negative role and as a brake.
d) Second Objective. The first stage having been completed, we must program
the second stage of our activities and objectives can be outlined as follows:
1. The efforts of the Greeks are to remove unreasonable and unfair provisions of the
administration and not to oppress the Turks;
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2. The removal of these factors of the administration must take place today because
tomorrow will be too late.
3. The removal of these provisions of the administration, although it is not possible
because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks and therefore, since it is not
possible by agreement with the Turks, unilateral action is justified;
4. The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the
right of intervention, by force or otherwise, to anyone;
5. The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable
rights of the minority.
e) It has been generally proven that today the international climate is against
every type of oppression and especially the oppression of minorities. The
Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union
of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is
judged that we have greater possibilities of succeeding in our efforts to
influence international public opinion in our favor if we present our demand,
as we did during the struggle, as a demand for exercising the right of self-
determination, rather than as a demand for Enosis. However, in order to
secure the right to exercise complete and free self-determination, first of all,
we must get rid of all those provisions of the Constitution and of the
Agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance etc.) which obstruct the
free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people
and which may open the way to dangers of external intervention.
It is exactly for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of
Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognized by the
Greek Cypriots.
When this achieved no power, legal or moral, can stop us from deciding our
future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.
From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan
a chain of actions and development is needed, each of which is a necessity and a
must, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically
unattainable, while at the same time we will expose the people and the country to
serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be classified under the following
headings:
a) Amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and parallel
abandonment in practice of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step
is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the
treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we
can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time external intervention
to prevent us amending them is held unjustified and inapplicable;
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b) After the above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention)
becomes legally and substantially inapplicable;
c) Once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions (of the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance) regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, the people
will be free to give expression to and implement their desire.
d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State (police and even friendly military
forces) of every internal or external intervention because then we shall be
completely independent.
Therefore the actions from (a) to (d) are absolutely necessary and must be
carried out in the above order and in time.
It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any possibility of success
internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the
various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it
is accepted that above four stages are necessary course, then it is unthinkable to
speak of amendments (stage (a)) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to
aim at the amendment of the negative aspects by arguing that this is necessary for the
functioning of the State and the Agreements.
     The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And
now on the internal front:
B. INTERNAL FRONT
The international actions are judged by the interpretations that will be given
to them internationally and by the effects that our actions will have on our national
cause.
     1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility
of external intervention. Not so much because of material damage, nor because of the
danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or
totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. If
intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention
would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both
internationally and in the United Nations. From the history of many recent instances
we have learned that in not a single case intervention, even when legally unjustified,
has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the attacker
without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli
attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations and on which
Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but revived (kept) the port of
Eilat on the Red Sea as a concession. Naturally, much more serious dangers exist for
Cyprus.
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But if we consider and justify our actions under (a) above well, on the one
hand the intervention will not be justified and, on the other, we will have every
support from the beginning, since by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot
take place before consultations between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece
and Turkey. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention) that will need
international support. We shall have it if the amendments proposed by us appear
reasonable and justifiable.
Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments
we would propose in the fist stage.
     Tactics: Reasonable Constitutional amendments after efforts for common
agreement is impossible we shall try to justify unilateral action. At this stage the
provisions in (ii) and (iii) of page 21 are applicable in parallel.
     2. It is obvious that for intervention to be justified, more serious reasons and a
more immediate danger must exist than mere constitutional amendments.
     Such reasons could be (a) and immediate declaration of Enosis before stages
(a),(c), (b) serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacre
of the Turks.
     Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the part and, consequently, only the
danger of inter-communal violence remains to be considered. Since we do not intend,
without provocation, to massacre or attack Turks, the possibility remains that the
Turks, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the
constitution, will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes the impression
that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be
imperative, for their protection.
     Tactics: Our actions for constitutional amendments will be open and we will
always appear ready for peaceful talks. Our actions will not be a provocative or
violent nature. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a
legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to the plan. All actions will be
clothed in legal form.
     3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established and
is accepted, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts from us, such as
the unification of municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the
Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification and seizure of
municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react forcefully.
Therefore it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the
provision of the 70 to 30 ratio, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive
violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but a refusal to
act. The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regards to taxation
legislation. These measures have already been studied and a series of similar
measures have been decided for implementation. Once our right of unilateral
amendments to the constitution is established de facto by some such actions, then we
shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more forcefully.
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     4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts
of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been
described above, without the Turks attempting to create or to stage violent clashes.
Exactly for this reason, the existence and strengthening of our Organisation is
imperative because:
     a) In the event of spontaneous Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not
immediate, we run the risk of having panic created among Greeks, particularly in the
towns, and thus we run the danger of losing substantial vital areas irreparably, while
on the other hand an immediate and timely show of our strength may bring the Turks
to their senses and confine their actions to insignificant, isolated acts, and
     b) In the event of a planned or spurious attack of the Turks, staged or not, it is
imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we
succeed in gaining command of the situation in one or two days, no outside
intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.
     c) In all above cases, the forceful and decisive confrontation of any Turkish effort
will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments.
It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish
reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be impossible or seriously
harmful for their community, and
     d) In the event of the clashes becoming widespread and general we must be ready
to proceed immediately with the actions described in (a), to (d), including the
immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor
room for diplomatic action.
     5. At all these stages we should not overlook the factor of propaganda, and to
counter the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our
plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle
must pass through at least four stages and that we must not reveal our plans and
intentions publicly and prematurely. Complete discretion and secrecy is more than a
national duty. IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY FOR SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS.
This will not deter the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from
indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations.
The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the
opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of
constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes
more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances,
even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However all this must
not draw us into irresponsible demagogy, street politics or bidding higher in the
stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event,
because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before
the next elections, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint
and remain cool, for obvious reasons.
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At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and
discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. We can only achieve this by the
necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.
Before everything else we have to expose the true identities of the
reactionaries. They are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists, as their
recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically
oppose our leadership, but at the same time without offering a substantive and
practical solution of their own. In order to promote all our actions we need a steady
and strong government until the last moment. These are known as verbalisms and
sloganists, with pretty words and slogans, but they are unable and unwilling to
proceed to concrete acts or to themselves. They must, therefore, be alienated and
isolated.
In parallel and at the same time, we shall brief our members about the above
plan and intentions, but ONLY VERBALLY. Our Sub-headquarters must, in
gatherings of our members, analyze and explain fully and continuously the above,
until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others.
NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF
ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO HIGH TREASON. No
act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present
document or its publication by our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing
of the present document or its publication by our opponents.
With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing and guidance, all our other
actions, specially publications in the press, resolutions etc. must be very restrained
and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and
gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of
the Chief of Sub-headquarters, references in general terms to the above plan. And
this only after the explicit approval of the Chief of Sub-headquarters who will also
control the text. Even in this case, ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES TO
THESE TEXTS IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION ARE
PERMITTED.
     Tactics: All the briefing of our people and of the public BY WORD OF
MOUTH. We should make every effort to appear as moderates in public. Projection
of or reference to our plans in the press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials
and other responsible persons will continue to brief the people and to raise their
morale and fighting spirit, but such briefing excludes making our plans public
knowledge by the press or otherwise.
     NOTE: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of
the Chief of Regional HQ in the presence of all the General Staff within 10 days
from its receipt. Copies in full or in part are prohibited. Members of the staff of the
Regional HQ may have the plan on the personal responsibility of the Chief of
Regional HQ, but may not take it out of the Regional HQ.
     The Leader AKRITAS
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APPENDIX D
S/RES/186 (1964)
                                   RESOLUTION 186 (1964)
Adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964
The Security Council,
Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten
international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional
measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties
signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to
worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger
international peace;
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the
maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take a11 additional measures
necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the
utmost restraint:
4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus,
of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the
Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the
Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander
of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The
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Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully
informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;
5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be in the interest of
preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a
recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;
6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three
months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them,
by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus.
The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for the purpose;
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement
with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and United
Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of
the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of
promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting
Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the
well- being of the people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and
security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his
efforts;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United
Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his
staff.
Adopted unanimously at the I 102nd meeting.
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APPENDIX E
A/RES/37/253
16 May 1983
Question of Cyprus
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Cyprus,
Recalling its resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent
resolutions on the question of Cyprus,
Recalling the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979,
Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and acquisition
of territories by force,
Greatly concerned at the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, which poses a
serious threat to international peace and security,
Deeply regretting that the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus have
not yet been implemented,
Recalling the idea of holding an international conference on Cyprus,
Deploring the fact that part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still
occupied by foreign forces,
Deploring the lack of progress in the inter-communal talks,
Deploring all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of
Cyprus or promote fait accomplis,
Reaffirming the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by
peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions,
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1. Reiterates its full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and calls once again for
the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;
2. Affirms the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and
effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural
and other resources and calls upon all States to support and help the Government of
the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights;
3. Condemns any act which tends to undermine the full and effective exercise
of the above-mentioned rights, including the unlawful issue of titles of ownership of
property;
4. Welcomes the proposal for total demilitarization made by the President of
the Republic of Cyprus;
5. Expresses its support for the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977
and 19 May 1979 and all the provisions thereof;
6. Demands the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212
(XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the
Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, and of the
subsequent resolutions of the Assembly and the Council on Cyprus which provide
the valid and essential basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus;
7. Considers the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of
Cyprus as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the
problem of Cyprus;
8. Demands the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the
Republic of Cyprus;
9. Commends the intensification of the efforts made by the Secretary-
General, while noting with concern the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks;
10. Calls for meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive
negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices
of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely and on an equal footing, on the basis
of relevant United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements, with a view to
reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on the
fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities;
11. Calls for respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
Cypriots, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the
right to property, and the instituting of urgent measures for the voluntary return of
the refugees to their homes in safety;
12. Considers that the de facto situation created by the force of arms should
not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem of
Cyprus;
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13. Calls upon the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action
which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the
problem of Cyprus by peaceful means and to co-operate fully with the Secretary-
General in the performance of his task under the relevant resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council as well as with the United Nations Peace-keeping
Force in Cyprus;
14. Calls upon the parties concerned to refrain from any action which violates
or is designed to violate the independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic of Cyprus;
15. Reiterates its recommendation that the Security Council should examine
the question of implementation, within a specified time-frame, of its relevant
resolutions and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and
practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the speedy
and effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus;
16. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as expressed in his
report, to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the
problem of Cyprus and, in view of this, requests the Secretary-General to undertake
such actions or initiatives as he may consider appropriate within the framework of
the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council for promoting a
just and lasting solution of the problem and to report to the General Assembly at its
thirty-eighth session on the results of his efforts;
17. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item
entitled "Question of Cyprus" and requests the Secretary-General to follow up the
implementation of the present resolution and to report on all its aspects to the
General Assembly at that session.
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APPENDIX F
S/RES/541 (1983)
18 November 1983
RESOLUTION 541 (1983)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2500th meeting on 18 November 1983
The Security Council,
Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus,
Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15
November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,
Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty
concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee,
Considering, therefore, that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in
Cyprus,
Reaffirming its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975),
Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the mission
of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,
Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force
in Cyprus,
Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,
1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported
secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;
2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for
its withdrawal;
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3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365
(1974) and 367 (1975);
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, in
order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in
Cyprus;
5. Calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his
mission of good offices;
6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the
Republic of Cyprus;
8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from
any action which might exacerbate the situation;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully
informed.
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APPENDIX G
S/RES/550 (1984)
 11 May 1984
RESOLUTION 550 (1984)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2539th meeting on 11May 1984
 The Security Council,
Having considered the situation in Cyprus at the request of the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus,
Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/16519),
Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983) and 544 (1983),
Deeply regretting the non-implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolution
541 (1983),
Gravely concerned by the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the
Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983), namely, the
purported "exchange of ambassadors" between Turkey and the legally invalid
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the contemplated holding of a
"constitutional referendum" and "elections", as well as by other actions or threats of
actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent State and the
division of Cyprus,
Deeply concerned by recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other
than its inhabitants,
Reaffirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping
Force in Cyprus,
1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective
implementation;
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2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of
ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them
illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;
3. Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported States of
the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" set up by secessionist acts and calls upon
them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;
4. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;
5. Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its
inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration
of the United Nations;
6. Considers any attempts to interfere with status or the deployment of the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to the resolutions of the
United Nations;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the urgent implementation of
Security Council resolution 541 (1983);
8. Reaffirms its mandate of good offices given to the Secretary-General and
requests him to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the Cyprus
problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
the provisions for such a settlement laid down in the pertinent United Nations
resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present
resolution;
9. Calls upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his
mission of good offices;
10. Decides to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking, in the
event of non-implementation of its resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution,
urgent and appropriate measures;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the implementation of the
present resolution and to report to the Security Council as developments require.
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APPENDIX H
S/RES/649 (1990)
12 March 1990
RESOLUTION 649 (1990)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2909th meeting, on 12 March 1990
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the secretary-general of 8 March 1990
(S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in
Cyprus and on his assessment of the current situation,
Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,
Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22
February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to
demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to co-operate with the
secretary-general so that the talks will result in a major step forward toward the
resolution of the Cyprus problem,
Expressing its regret that, in the more than 25 years since the establishment of
UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects
of the Cyprus problem,
Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to
achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement,
1. Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for
the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two
communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal
Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other
country and any form of partition or secession;
2. Expresses its full support for the current effort of the secretary-general in
carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;
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3. Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to
reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a
federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal
as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and
1979 high level agreements, and to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the
Secretary General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an
outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989;
4. Requests the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices in
order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, toward this end, to assist the two
communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions;
5. Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could
aggravate the situation;
6. Decides to remain actively seized of the situation and the current effort;
7. Requests the Secretary General to inform the Council in his report due by
31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing
an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution.
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APPENDIX I
Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus (1992)
1. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot
community have negotiated on an equal footing, under the auspices of the mission of
good offices of the Secretary-General, the following overall framework agreement on
Cyprus which constitutes a major step towards a just and lasting settlement of the
Cyprus question. The overall framework agreement will be submitted to the two
communities in separate referendums within thirty days of its completion by the two
leaders at a high-level international meeting.
I. OVERALL OBJECTIVES
2. The overall framework agreement is an integrated whole which, when it is
approved by both communities in separate referendums and the provisions contained
in the transitional arrangements have been implemented, will result in a new
partnership and a new constitution for Cyprus that will govern the relations of the
two communities on a federal basis that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional
aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects. The overall framework
agreement is based on the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, relevant United
Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 367  (1975), 649
(1990), 716 (1991) and 750 (1992), and the guiding principles set out below.
3. The overall framework agreement recognizes that Cyprus is the common home of
the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community and that their
relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the
federal republic of Cyprus. It safeguards the cultural, religious, political, social and
linguistic identity of each community.
4. The overall framework agreement ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based on a
State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and
comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the
Secretary General's report of 3 April 1992  (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal
federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any
other country or any form of partition or secession.
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5. The overall framework agreement acknowledges and ensures the political equality
of the two communities. While political equality does not mean equal numerical
participation in all branches and administration of the federal government, it will be
reflected in the fact that the approval and amendment of the federal constitution will
require the approval of both communities; in the effective participation of both
communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government; in safeguards to
ensure that the federal government will not be empowered to adopt any measures
against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and
functions of the two federated states.
6. The overall framework agreement provides for functions and powers of the federal
government, including its structure, composition and functioning of its three
branches, that will ensure the effective participation of the two communities and the
effective functioning of the federal government, which will require an appropriate
deadlock-resolving machinery.
7. The two communities acknowledge each other's identity and integrity, and commit
themselves to work actively to achieve a new relationship based on mutual respect,
friendship and co-operation. Toward this end, the two communities agree to change
all practices incompatible with this commitment and to refrain from any action which
would impair the efforts for a negotiated settlement. They pledge to launch
immediately a programme of action to promote goodwill and closer relations
between them (see appendix).
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
8. The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them in the
federal government will rest with the two federated states.
9. The federal constitution will come into force after its approval by the two
communities in separate referendums and can only be amended with the approval of
both federated states.
10. The federal republic will be one territory composed of two politically equal
federated states.
11. The federal republic will have one sovereignty which is indivisible and which
emanates equally from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. One
community cannot claim sovereignty over the other community. The federal republic
will have one international personality and one citizenship regulated by federal law
in accordance with the federal constitution.
12. The federal constitution will safeguard the identity, integrity and security of each
community as well as their political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic and
religious rights. All citizens will be equal under the law.
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13. The federal republic will be secular. Religious functionaries will be prohibited
from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal government or in the
federated states.
14. The federal republic will maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and
Turkey and will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in
connection with all agreements whatever their nature. The federal republic will
continue the membership in the Commonwealth.
15. The official languages of the federal republic will be Greek and Turkish. The
English language may also be used.
16. The federal republic will have its own flag to be agreed upon. The federal flag
will be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of all other
flags. Each federated state will have its own flag.
17. The holidays to be observed by the federal government will be agreed upon and
embodied in the federal constitution. Each federated state will observe the federal
holidays as well as those established by it.
18. The two federated states will have identical powers and functions.
19. Each federated state will be administered by one community.
20. Each federated state will decide on its own governmental arrangement in a
manner consistent with the federal constitution.
21. The federal Government cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of the
two federated states.
22. Security, law and order and the administration of justice in its territory will be the
responsibility of each federated state in a manner consistent with the federal
constitution.
23. The two federated states will cooperate in the preservation and / or use of
historical sites and religious shrines of both faiths to be agreed to during the
transitional period.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERATION
24. The powers, functions and structure of the federal Government will be in
conformity with the overall objectives and guiding principles set out above.
A. Powers and functions to be vested in the federal Government
25. The federal Government will have the powers and functions listed below. All
powers and functions not vested in the federal Government will rest with the two
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federated states. The federated states may decide jointly to confer additional powers
and functions to the federal Government or to transfer powers and functions from the
federal Government to the federated states.
26. The federal Government will have the following powers and functions:
(a) Foreign affairs (the federated states may enter into agreements with foreign
Governments and international organizations in their areas of competence. The
representation in foreign affairs will reflect the bi-communal nature of the federal
republic);
 (b) Central bank functions (including the issuance of currency);
 (c) Customs and the coordination of international trade;
 (d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters;
 (e) Federal budget and federal taxation;
 (f) Immigration and citizenship;
 (g) Defense (to be discussed also in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee and
of Alliance);
 (h) Federal judiciary and federal police;
 (i) Federal postal and telecommunications services;
 (j) Patents and trademarks;
 (k) Appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek
Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio);
 (l) Standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural
resources, and weights and measures;
 (m) Coordination of tourism and industrial activities.
27. The federal powers and functions will be executed by the federal Government or,
in accordance with agreements, through delegation to the federated states.
B. Structure, Composition and Functioning of the Federal Government
1. The Legislature
28. The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The
presidents of the lower house and of the upper house cannot come from the same
community. The president and vice-president of each house will not come from the
same community.
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29. All laws must be approved by both houses.
30. The lower house will be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot / Turkish
Cypriot ratio.
31. The upper house will have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states.
32. All laws will be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek
Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot representatives in the lower house may decide, on matters
related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and
citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house will require separate
majorities of the representatives of both communities.
33. Separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities will be required to
constitute a quorum in each house. If a quorum is not attained in either house on two
consecutive meetings because of the absence of a majority of one or both
communities, the president of the relevant house will call a meeting in no less than
five days and no more than ten days. At that meeting, a majority of the upper house
will constitute a quorum. In the lower house, 30% of the total membership will
constitute a quorum.
34. If the two houses fail to adopt a bill or decision, they will initiate proceedings to
obtain a consensus while ensuring the continued functioning of the federal
government. To this end, a conference committee will be established. The conference
committee will be composed of two persons each selected by the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot groups equally from among the members of the two houses of the
federal legislature. The text of the legislation or decision agreed to by the conference
committee will be submitted to both houses for approval.
35. In the event the federal budget is not adopted in one or both houses and until an
agreement is reached by the conference committee and is adopted by both houses,
the provisions of the most recent federal budget plus inflation shall remain in effect.
2. The Executive
36. The federal executive will consist of a federal president, a federal vice-president,
and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice president will
symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities.
(On the question of the election of the president and vice-president, the two sides
have expressed different positions. The Greek Cypriot side prefers a system under
which the president is elected by popular universal suffrage. The Turkish Cypriot
side prefers a system under which the president rotates between the two
communities).
37. To facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the initial
eight years, the president and vice-president will also be the heads of their respective
federated states.
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38. There will be a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio. The president and vice-president will designate the
ministers from their respective communities who will appoint them by an instrument
signed by them both. One of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs,
finance, or defence, will be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot minister. The president
and the foreign minister will not come from the same community.
39. The president and the vice-president will discuss the preparation of the agenda of
the council of ministers and each can include items in the agenda.
40. Decisions of the council of ministers will be taken by majority vote. However,
decisions of the council of ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security,
budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship will require the concurrence of both the
president and the vice-president.
41. Arrangements related to the implementation of foreign policy and the
composition of the foreign service will be set out in the federal constitution.
42. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right
to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence,
security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship. The president and vice-
president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of
the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration.
3. The Judiciary
43. The federal judiciary will consist of a supreme court composed of an equal
number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the
president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house. The supreme court
will sit as the federal constitutional court and the highest court of the federation. Its
presidency will rotate between the senior Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
members of the supreme court. Lower federal courts may be established in each
federated state.
44. The supreme court will deal with matters arising under the federal constitution
and federal laws, and will be empowered to fulfil other judiciary functions related to
federal matters attributed to it by the federal constitution or federal legislation.
45. Each federated state will have its own judiciary to deal with matters not attributed
to the federal judiciary by the federal constitution.
46. The federal constitution will establish the procedure for ascertaining the
constitutionality of federal laws and executive acts, as well as adequate machinery of
judicial review to ensure the compliance of legislative, executive, and judicial acts of
the federated states with the federal constitution.
C. Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social,
and cultural rights
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47. All universally recognised fundamental rights and freedoms will be included in
the federal constitution.
48. The freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property
will be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The implementation of these rights
will take into account the 1977 high-level agreement and the guiding principles set
out above.
49. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as
the federal republic is established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal police
functions.
50. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after the
resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed. The
federated states will regulate these rights in a manner to be agreed upon during the
transitional period consistent with the federal constitution.
51. Persons who are known to have been or are actively involved in acts of violence
or in incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons of the other community
may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from going to the federated state
administered by the other community.
IV. SECURITY AND GUARANTEE
52. The security of the federal republic and of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
federated states will be guaranteed.
53. The demilitarization of the federal republic remains an objective.
54. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance continue in force and will be
supplemented in a document to be appended as set out below.
55. The Treaty of Guarantee will ensure the independence and territorial integrity of
the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and
any form of partition or secession; ensure the security of the Greek Cypriot and the
Turkish Cypriot federated states; and ensure against the unilateral change of the new
constitutional order of the federal republic by either community.
56. A numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the
one hand and of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot troops and equipment on the other
hand will be achieved within ______ months after the overall framework agreement
has been approved by the two communities in separate referendums.
57. A timetable will be established for the further reduction to an agreed level of the
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all non-
Cypriot forces not provided for under the Treaty of Alliance. This timetable will be
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fully implemented prior to the establishment of the federal republic and in phases
parallel to the implementation of the programme of action set out in annex.
58. The Treaty of Alliance will provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and
Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding ______ persons each.
The Greek contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered by the
Greek Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state administered by the
Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish contingent will be stationed in the
federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community and cannot enter the
federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community.
59. The federal republic will maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek Cypriot
and a Turkish Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding the size of the
Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command of the president and
the vice-president. The Greek Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state
administered by the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot unit will be
stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community. The
president and the vice-president will jointly decide on the locations of the units.
60. There will not be any reserve force and any military or paramilitary training of
civilian groups.
61. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot units will promote mutual respect,
friendship, and closer relations between the two communities and foster their welfare
by carrying out joint social service activities throughout the federal republic.
62. Each federated state and the federal republic will have a police force. All
paramilitary activities and the ownership of weapons other than those licensed for
hunting will be outlawed throughout the federal republic and any infraction will be a
federal offense. The importation or transit of weapons and other military equipment
other than that duly approved by the federal government will be prohibited.
63. Immediately after the approval of the overall framework agreement by the two
communities in separate referendums, an interim monitoring committee will be
established composed of the three guarantor powers, the two communities and the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which will be
responsible for:
 (a) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed numerical balance of Greek  and
Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand to be implemented within ______
months after the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two
communities in separate referendums;
(b) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed timetable for the further reduction to
the agreed level of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot units and the withdrawal of all
non-Cypriot forces not provided for in the Treaty of Alliance prior to the
establishment of the federal republic.
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64. The Treaty of Guarantee, in a manner consistent with the principles of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with which the federal
republic will affirm its commitment, will provide for a supervision and verification
committee comprising representatives of the guarantor powers and of the federal
president and federal vice-president. The United Nations will provide the support
personnel to assist the supervision and verification committee in carrying out its
functions.
65. The supervision and verification committee will be responsible for investigating
any development which in the view of either the federal president or federal vice-
president or any guarantor power is a threat to the security of either community or of
the federal republic through on-site inspection and other methods the supervision and
verification committee deems necessary. The supervision and verification committee
will make recommendations for rectifying any situation it has established to be in
contravention of the arrangements covered by the Treaties of Guarantee and of
Alliance. The parties will be obligated to implement these recommendations
promptly and in good will.
66. The United Nations Security Council will be requested to revise the mandate of
UNFICYP, including support of the supervision and verification committee.
V. TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS
67. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities agree on the territories of
the federated states administered by each, taking into account the 1977 high-level
agreement.
68. The map attached hereto sets out the territories of the two federated states. The
territorial agreement shall be respected and will be included in the federal
constitution.
69. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments will have the option of remaining
in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by their own
community.
70. All necessary arrangements for the relocation of persons affected by territorial
adjustments will be satisfactorily implemented before resettlements are carried out.
The fund to be established related to displaced persons will be available for this
purpose.
71. The territorial adjustment will not affect the water resources available to each
federated state. The water resources available throughout the federation will be
allocated to the two federated states at a proportion at least equal to their respective
current demand.
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VI. DISPLACED PERSONS
72. The property claims of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons are
recognized and will be dealt with fairly on the basis of atime-frame and practical
regulations based on the 1977 high-level agreement, on the need to ensure social
peace and harmony, and on the arrangements set out below.
A. Areas that will come under Greek Cypriot administration
73. The first priority will be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support for
Turkish Cypriots living in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot
administration and to displaced persons returning to that area.
74. Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that will come under Greek
Cypriot administration will have the option to remain in their property or to request
to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish Cypriot
administration. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons currently residing in the area that
will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have the option to receive
comparable residence in that area, to return to their former residence, or to receive a
comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish Cypriot
administration.
75. A bi-communal committee will be established immediately after the overall
framework agreement has been approved in the referendums to arrange for suitable
housing for all persons affected by the territorial adjustments.
B. Other areas under Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administration
76. Each community will establish an agency to deal with all matters related to
displaced persons.
77. The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those
persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the community in
which the property is located. To this end, all titles of properties will be exchanged
on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 1974 value plus
inflation. Displaced persons will be compensated by the agency of their community
from funds obtained from the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or
through the exchange of property. The shortfall in funds necessary for compensation
will be covered by the federal Government from a compensation fund obtained from
various possible sources such as windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred
properties following the overall agreement, and savings from defense spending.
Governments and international organizations will also be invited to contribute to the
compensation fund. In this connection, the option of long-term leasing and other
commercial arrangements may also be considered.
78. Persons from both communities who in 1974 resided and / or owned property in
the federated state administered by the other community or their heirs will be able to
file compensation claims. Persons belonging to the Turkish Cypriot community who
were displaced after December 1963 or their heirs may also file claims.
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79. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement owned
their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other community
and who wish to resume their permanent residence at that location may also select
the option to return.
80. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement rented
their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other community
and who wish to resume their permanent residence in that area will be given priority
under the freedom of settlement arrangements.
81. All claims must be filed within six months after the approval of the overall
framework agreement.
82. ______ thousand displaced persons who elect to return to their former permanent
residence will be processed by the federated state concerned each year for ______
years. In addition, Maronites who in 1974 had their permanent residence in the
federated state under the administration of the Turkish Cypriot community may elect
to return to their properties. The two federated states will review the situation at the
conclusion of the above mentioned period in the light of the experience gained.
83. This period will begin after the resettlement and rehabilitation process arising
from territorial adjustments are essentially completed.
84. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who
will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. If the current occupant is also a
displaced person and wishes to remain, or if the property has been substantially
altered or has been converted to public use, the former permanent resident will be
compensated or will be provided an accommodation of similar value.
85. Persons who are known to have been actively or are actively involved in acts of
violence or incitement to violence and / or hatred against persons of the other
community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to the
federated state administered by the other community.
VII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SAFEGUARDS
86. A priority objective of the federal republic will be the development of a balanced
economy that will benefit equally both federated states. A major programme of
action will be established to correct the economic imbalance and ensure economic
equilibrium between the two communities through special measures to promote the
development of the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community.
A special fund will be established for this purpose. Foreign Governments and
international organizations will be invited by the Security Council to contribute to
this fund.
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87. To help promote a balanced economy, persons may be employed throughout the
federal republic at equal pay.
88. To protect in particular the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot
community, special measures and safeguards will be adopted to avoid adverse
economic effects resulting from the establishment of the federal republic, for
example as a result of the adoption of one currency and the establishment of one
customs frontier.
89. Each federated state may, in addition to federal taxation, establish and administer
its own tax regime and determine tax rates in line with its economic objectives and
needs.
90. In line with annex F, part II, of the Treaty of Establishment, the federal republic
will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in connection with
all agreements whatever their nature.
91. A bi-communal committee will be established as part of the transitional
arrangements to prepare the special programmes and measures envisaged above prior
to the establishment of the federal republic. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) will provide the committee with support. The committee may
request other expert assistance as required.
92. Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European
Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the
approval of the two communities in separate referendums. (This paragraph relates
exclusively to arrangements that might be put in place in Cyprus and in no way
impinges upon the prerogatives of the European Community and its member states in
matters concerning membership in the Community).
VIII. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
93. Immediately after the approval in separate referendums of the overall framework
agreement on Cyprus, the following transitional arrangements will be carried out to
implement the overall framework agreement, including the preparation and putting
into force of the federal constitution. All transitional arrangements will be fully
implemented in an 18- month period.
94. In line with this overall framework agreement, bi-communal committees will be
established immediately to implement the provisions related to the preparation and
putting into force of the federal constitution and electoral law, the establishment of
the federal civil service, property settlement claims, economic development and
safeguards, arrangements related to the territorial adjustments to take effect at the
time the federal republic is established, and the programme of action set out in the
appendix. Furthermore, a committee composed of the representatives of the
guarantor powers and the two communities will be established to supplement the
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Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. The United Nations will assist each committee
in fulfilling its functions. Each side may employ foreign experts.
95. In addition, a committee composed of the leaders of the two communities and a
representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be established
immediately to work out the transitional arrangements procedures foreseen herein
and to ensure that the functions of the above mentioned committees are implemented
in an effective and timely manner. Furthermore, this committee will, within 30 days
of its completion by the two leaders at a high-level international meeting, organize
separate referendums to approve the overall framework agreement, and, at the
appropriate time during the transitional period, organize separate referendums to
approve the federal constitution and the elections of federal officials with the
assistance of and verification by the United Nations.
96. During the transitional period, the current arrangements for the administration of
the day-to-day internal affairs of each side will continue, unless modified by the
provisions of the overall framework agreement. In matters affecting Cyprus as a
whole, such as international trade and tourism, the same principle shall apply on the
understanding that these matters will be administered on an interim basis in the
common interest. To this end, interim procedures will be agreed to by the two
communities.
97. During the transitional period, external affairs shall be conducted in a manner
which accords with the principles contained in the overall framework agreement and
in consensus with the leaders of the two communities. Arrangements shall be made
for joint delegations, in particular to international meetings.
98. The statutes, laws, regulations, rules, contracts currently in effect on both sides
shall be considered valid to the extent they are not inconsistent with the overall
framework agreement. The federal government may review prior international
agreements to determine whether any action should be taken in respect thereto.
99. Each community will prepare its federated state constitution and electoral law in
line with the federal constitution and electoral law, and will organize its federated
state governmental arrangements which shall both come into being at the same time
that the federal republic is established.
100. The date of entry into force of the federal constitution will be specified therein
and will be the date on which the federal republic comes into being.
IX. NOTIFICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
101. As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved in separate
referendums by each community, the leaders of the two communities will address a
letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting to him the text of
the overall framework agreement with the request that he submit the letter and the
overall framework agreement to the Security Council so that the Council may take
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note of the decision of the two communities to establish a federal republic in the
manner described in the overall framework agreement.
Appendix
As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two
communities in separate referendums the following programme of action to promote
goodwill and close relations between the two communities will be implemented.
1. The flow of persons and goods, services, capital, communication, and international
assistance from and / or to Cyprus will take place on an equal basis throughout
Cyprus and any restrictions to the contrary will be lifted.
2. All restrictions on travel by members of the Turkish Cypriot community will be
lifted. The two communities will agree on interim procedures.
3. The restrictions on the movement of tourists will be lifted.
4. Objections to the participation in international sport and cultural activities will be
lifted.
5. The freedom of movement will be facilitated subject, by way of agreement
between the two communities, only to minimal procedures.
6. Pending the establishment of the federal republic, Varosha will be placed under
United Nations administration and a programme of action for its restoration will be
prepared and implemented.
7. All military modernization programmes and strengthening of positions will cease.
The two sides will cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the unmanning of
positions along the buffer zone to all areas where the troops of both sides remain in
close proximity to each other. The freedom of movement of UNFICYP throughout
Cyprus will be ensured.
8. A bi-communal committee will be established to review the textbooks used in
schools on each side and make recommendations for the removal of material that is
contrary to the promotion of goodwill and close relations between the two
communities. The committee may also recommend positive measures to promote that
objective.
9. Both communities will promote goodwill and close relations between them and
friendly relations with Greece and Turkey.
10. Both communities will, within the limits of their authority, terminate all current
or pending recourse before an international body against the other community or
Greece or Turkey.
11. A bi-communal committee will be established to survey the water situation in
Cyprus and make recommendations on ways of meeting the water needs of Cyprus,
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including from external sources. The committee may request expert assistance as
required.
12. A bi-communal committee will be established to prepare and launch a
programme of action for the restoration of historical and religious sites throughout
Cyprus. The committee may request expert assistance as required.
13. A bi-communal committee will be established to undertake a population census
of both communities. The committee may request expert assistance as required.
14. The two communities undertake to support the efforts of the Committee on
Missing Persons to reach early conclusions wherever possible on the fate of the
missing persons. To this end, the Committee is requested to undertake without delay
the investigation of all cases of missing persons and, to this end, to reassess the
criteria for arriving at conclusions on the fate of the missing.
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APPENDIX J
Turkey - TRNC Joint Statement
4 July 1997
At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Turkey, H.E. Mr.
Süleyman Demirel, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, H.E.
Mr. Rauf Denktaş, has paid an official visit to Ankara on 4 July 1997.
During this visit, an exchange of views and consultations on the face-to-face
talks which are scheduled to take place in New York between 9-13 July 1997, and
subjects relating to the further development of relations between Turkey and the
TRNC have taken place.
During the visit, the parties have announced the following common views
and decisions:
1. The U.N. Secretary General's mission of good offices is with the two equal
communities in the Island, and the finding, of a freely negotiated and mutually
acceptable settlement by the two leaders is the basis of this mission of good
offices. Any outside interference with the negotiating process, which will be
conducted within the U.N. framework and on the basis of the parameters which
have been established through this process, cannot be accepted. It is in this
understanding that the parties are supporting the direct negotiations process and
believe that the New York talks constitute an appropriate opportunity for the
finding of a just and realistic settlement to the Cyprus dispute.
2. The Turkish Cypriot side will participate in these talks in a constructive and
positive spirit. Bi-communality, bi-zonality and the political equality of the two
sides will form the fundamental parameters of a lasting solution.
3. In Cyprus there are two separate peoples and administrations. The approach of
regarding the Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate government, in
contravention of international law, does not in any way contribute to the
settlement of the Cyprus question. The acceptance of the Turkish Cypriot side's
equal political and legal status and the lifting of the restrictive measures applied
against the TRNC in the international field will facilitate and enhance the efforts
directed towards a settlement.
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4. Establishing a climate of confidence between the two sides is a prerequisite for a
lasting settlement in Cyprus. The political, legal and sovereign rights as well as
the legitimate interests of the Turkish Cypriot side must be safeguarded. A
settlement arrived at through negotiations conducted freely will be submitted to
the approval of the two peoples through separate referenda.
5. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance will remain valid and in effect
under all circumstances; any direct or indirect alteration of these treaties will not
be allowed and Turkey's effective and physical guarantee will continue.
6. By virtue of the 1960 Treaties an internal balance between the two communities
in Cyprus, on the one hand, and an external balance between Turkey and Greece,
on the basis of their rights and obligations, on the other, have been established.
The external balance in question is an integral part of the regional peace and
stability. The 1960 treaties stipulate that Cyprus cannot join any international
political or economic union of which both Turkey and Greece are not members.
According to the dictates of international law and regional peace and stability,
Cyprus can only become a full member of the EU after a settlement which will
comprise these principles and once Turkey has become a member as well. Each
step the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus takes on the road to
EU membership, on the basis of its unilateral application in contravention of
international law, will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
7. The massive militarization efforts of the Greek Cypriot side and the construction
of air force and navy bases for Greece in Southern Cyprus, in the context of the
"Joint Defence Doctrine", the prospect of the deployment in the South of
weapons systems capable of threatening Turkey, and the support given to
terrorist activities are elements which threaten not only the security of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the region, but the security of Turkey
as well. Turkey is carefully following these negative developments not only from
the standpoint of the security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriot people, but
also from the standpoint of its own security requirements. The parties consider
the principles contained in the Joint Declaration of 20 January 1997 between the
Presidents of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as
indispensable elements of a lasting peace in the region.
8. The two sides have decided to act in line with the above views and considerations
and to be in close consultation and cooperation with each other throughout the
negotiating process which will resume in New York. In this spirit, Turkey wilt
continue to support the constructive attitude adopted by TRNC President Mr.
Rauf Denktaş during the negotiations, as it has done up to now.
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APPENDIX K
CONFEDERATION PROPOSAL (31 AUGUST 1998)
Mr.Denktaş, President of the TRNC, made a peace call to the Greek Cypriot
side and proposed "to establish together a Confederation in Cyprus".
President Denktaş's five-point proposal is as follows:
"PROPOSAL FOR A LASTING SOLUTION IN CYPRUS
As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus I
propose the establishment of the Cyprus Confederation based on the following
arrangements:
1. A special relationship between Turkey and TRNC on the basis of agreements
to be concluded.
2. A similar special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot
Administration on the basis of symmetrical agreements to be concluded
3. Establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between TRNC and GCA.
4. The 1960 guarantee system shall continue.
5. The Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a policy
of accession to the EU. Until Turkey's full membership to the EU, a special
arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an
EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation.
The ultimate aim of the negotiations will thus be a partnership settlement
which will be a confederated structure composed of two peoples and of two states of
the island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands
and guarantor states. All rights and powers which are not referred to the confederal
entity will reside with the two confederated states. Any agreement to be reached as a
result of the negotiations will be submitted for approval in separate referenda.
By participating in these negotiations the parties will acknowledge that the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides are two sovereign and equal states, each with its
own functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction, reflecting the political
equality and will of their respective peoples. They will also acknowledge that the
authorities of one party do not represent the other.
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We believe that only this structure
a) will provide for the security of both sides,
b) will safeguard their identity and well being.
If the Greek Cypriots agree to this final basis, we are ready to begin
negotiations to establish the Cyprus Confederation."
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APPENDIX L
S/RES/1250 (1999)
29 June 1999
                                   RESOLUTION 1250 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4018th meeting, on 29 June 1999
The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus, particularly resolution 1218
(1998) of 22 December 1998,
Reiterating its grave concern at the lack of progress towards an overall
political settlement on Cyprus,
Appreciating the statement of the Heads of State and Government of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on 20 June 1999
(S/1999/711, annex) calling for comprehensive negotiations in the autumn of 1999
under the auspices of the Secretary-General,
1. Expresses its appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General of 22
June 1999 (S/1999/707) on his mission of Good Offices in Cyprus;
2. Stresses its full support for the Secretary-General's mission of Good
Offices as decided by the Security Council and, in this context, for the efforts of the
Secretary-General and his Special Representative;
3. Reiterates its endorsement of the initiative of the Secretary-General
announced on 30 September 1998, within the framework of his mission of Good
Offices, with the goal of reducing tensions and promoting progress towards a just
and lasting settlement in Cyprus;
4. Notes that the discussions between the Secretary-General's Special
Representative and the two sides are continuing, and urges both sides to participate
constructively; 5. Expresses the view that both sides have legitimate concerns that
should be addressed through comprehensive negotiations covering all relevant issues;
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6. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with the relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions, to invite the leaders of the two sides to
negotiations in the autumn of 1999;
7. Calls upon the two leaders, in this context, to give their full support to such
a comprehensive negotiation, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and to
commit themselves to the following principles:
         - no preconditions;
         - all issues on the table;
         - commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is
reached;
         - full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties;
8. Requests the two sides on Cyprus, including military authorities on both
sides, to work constructively with the Secretary-General and his Special
Representative to create a positive climate on the island that will pave the way for
negotiations in the autumn of 1999;
9. Also requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed
of progress towards the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report to
the Council by 1 December 1999;
10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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APPENDIX M
S/RES/1251 (1999)
RESOLUTION 1251 (1999)
 Adopted by the Security Council in 1999,
The Security Council,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 8 June 1999  (S/1999/657
and Add.1) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,
Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the
prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 30 June 1999,
Reaffirming all its earlier resolutions on Cyprus, in particular resolutions
1217 (1998) of 22 December 1998 and 1218 (1998) of 22 December 1998,
Calling once more upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and requesting them, along with
the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as from any attempt at
partition of the island or its unification with any other country,
Noting that the situation along the ceasefire lines is essentially stable, but
expressing its grave concern at the increasing practice by both sides of engaging in
provocative behaviour along the ceasefire lines, which heightens the risk of more
serious incidents, Reminding the parties that the UNFICYP package of measures
aimed at reducing tensions along the ceasefire lines was designed to reduce incidents
and tensions, without affecting the security of either side, Reiterating the need to
make progress on a comprehensive political solution,
1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15
December 1999;
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2. Reminds both sides of their obligations to prevent any violence directed
against UNFICYP personnel, to cooperate fully with UNFICYP and to ensure its
complete freedom of movement;
3. Calls upon the military authorities on both sides to refrain from any action,
including acts of provocation in the vicinity of the buffer zone, which would
exacerbate tensions;
4. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue
to work intensively with the two sides with a view to early agreement on further
specific tension-reducing steps, with full consideration of its resolution 1218 (1998)
of 22 December 1998;
5. Calls upon both sides to take measures that will build trust and cooperation
and reduce tensions between the two sides, including demining along the buffer
zone;
6. Urges the Greek Cypriot side to agree to the implementation of the
UNFICYP package of measures, and encourages UNFICYP to continue its efforts
towards the rapid implementation of the package by both sides;
7. Reiterates its grave concern at the continuing excessive levels of military
forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being
expanded, upgraded and modernized, including by the introduction of advanced
weapon systems by either side, and at the lack of progress towards any significant
reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, which threaten
to raise tensions both on the island and in the region and complicate efforts to
negotiate an overall political settlement;
8. Calls upon all concerned to commit themselves to a reduction in defence
spending, a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, and
a staged process aimed at limiting and then substantially reducing the level of all
troops and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus as a first step towards the
withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), to
help restore confidence between the sides, stresses the importance of eventual
demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus as an objective in the context of an overall
comprehensive settlement, welcomes in this context any steps either side may take to
reduce armaments and troops, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to
promote efforts in this direction;
 9. Calls upon both sides to refrain from the threat or use of force or violence
as a means to resolve the Cyprus problem;
10. Reaffirms that the status quo is unacceptable and that negotiations on a
final political solution to the Cyprus problem have been at an impasse for too long;
11. Reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State
of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and
comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security
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Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a
settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form
of partition or secession;
12. Welcomes the ongoing efforts by UNFICYP to implement its
humanitarian mandate in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the
northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part, as
mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General;
13. Reiterates its support for the efforts of the United Nations and others
concerned to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build cooperation,
trust and mutual respect between the two communities, and calls upon the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership to resume such activities;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 1 December 1999
on the implementation of this resolution;
15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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APPENDIX N
"UN IDEAS ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT"1
FOLLOWING last week's publication on this page of the 'secret' UN 'non-
paper' on the ''Powers, Structure and Functions'' of the proposed Cyprus federal
government we continue this week with the revelation of the extensive statement
made separately to both sides by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the end of the
last round of proximity talks in Geneva earlier this month.
In this Annan expressed his thoughts about procedure and provided what he
described as ''a general outline of elements I believe should be part of a
comprehensive settlement.''
The Annan outline provides the clearest indication to date on the form of the
proposed settlement.
While the Greek Cypriot side appears to be ready to proceed with the talks on
the basis of the Annan outline, with certain reservations, the Turkish side has
indicated its total rejection of such an approach.
As we stated last week, these UN non-papers and ideas have been circulating
widely among diplomatic circles.
Certain embassies have been conducting an intensive campaign to persuade
influential personalities in the political and business sectors of each community of
the alleged merits of these ideas, the need for their acceptance and the likely
unpleasant consequences if they are rejected.
We feel that the people as a whole have as much right to become acquainted
and to express their views on the merits and demerits of the proposed settlement,
before it is presented to them as a fait accompli for acceptance or rejection in a
proposed referendum. Annan's outline for a comprehensive settlement:
1. I am very glad to join you and wish to thank you for accepting my invitation to
continue and intensify efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement. I was gratified
that, in New York, we saw the first signs of real engagement and I understand that
this has continued here in Geneva. I realise, of course, that there is a long way to go.
                                                          
1 It is taken from, The Cyprus Weekly of Nicosia on 24 November 2000.
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2. Since we are now seriously engaged in the substance, I wish to make a
number of observations. Further to my statement of 12 September, I want to give you
my thoughts, first about procedure, and then about some substantive aspects of a
possible comprehensive settlement, in the hope of facilitating negotiations. However,
I wish to make clear that, as with Mr de Soto's "Preliminary Thoughts" of 12 July,
and the subsequent ideas we have offered, I am not at this stage putting forward a
proposal, nor am I covering all the ground. I do not intend to make these remarks
public, but I will leave you with notes of what I say just for your record.
3. On procedure, the first thing I wish to do is to confirm that, as concerns the
United Nations, these negotiations are being conducted pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1250, which sets out four guidelines:
- no preconditions;
- all issues on the table;
- commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is
reached; and
- full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties.
These four guidelines cannot be invoked selectively; they all apply.
4. In these negotiations, each party represents its side - and no-one else - as
the political equal of the other, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
5. The aim is a comprehensive settlement covering all issues, encompassing
all legal instruments and other agreements needed to achieve and implement it,
including any agreements involving non-Cypriot actors. In other words, it should be
sent implementing. To this end, it should provide for appropriate mechanisms for
verification of compliance and binding timetables of implementation. It should leave
nothing to be negotiated subsequently. The settlement should include the text of a
'basic law' and texts on security arrangements, territorial adjustments and the
property regime, as well as the initial body of 'common state' legislation.
6. The comprehensive settlement should be submitted for approval in separate
referenda so as to ensure the democratic endorsement, legitimisation, and ratification
of the comprehensive settlement by each community. Unless otherwise specified in
the comprehensive settlement, subsequent changes to it could only occur by the same
method.
7. Since no useful purpose would be served by myself or Mr de Soto
conveying proposals from the parties back and forth, we are working towards a
single negotiating text as the basis for negotiations.
For this process to succeed it is essential that you provide specific comments
on ideas put forward by the UN. I would ask you to give us indications of what you
feel might not be fair or viable in the ideas we put to you, and why. This would be
more helpful to the process than substitute proposals, position papers or suggested
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amendments. Without your specific comments, and those of the other side, we cannot
take them on board in revising our submissions, and your participation in shaping the
negotiating text will be hampered. I ask you to engage with us fully in this way so as
to enable us to advance on all issues simultaneously.
8. On substance, as you know, we have intentionally avoided labels in these
talks so as to concentrate on the underlying issues. I would like to give you a general
outline of elements I believe should be a part of a comprehensive settlement. Again, I
am not seeking your agreement on them at this time. Rather, I wish to indicate what I
believe the parties ought reasonably to accept as a fair and viable compromise. I will
now describe the elements - which, I emphasise, are not an exhaustive list.
9. The comprehensive settlement should enshrine a new partnership on which
to build a better future in peace, security and prosperity on a united island. The equal
status of the parties in a united Cyprus must and should be recognised explicitly in
the comprehensive settlement, which will embody the results of the detailed
negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions.
10. Cyprus should have a single international legal personality. Whatever is
eventually agreed regarding the status of the two 'component states', there should be
one sovereign, indissoluble 'common state' that emerges from these negotiations, nor
try to unite all or part of the island with Greece or Turkey. Nor should either side be
able to dominate the 'common state' or the other 'component state'. There should be a
single citizenship. Human rights and fundamental freedoms should be guaranteed.
11. The 'common state' should have what we are calling, for now, a 'common
government', with a 'basic law' prescribing powers exercised by legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. The 'common government' should be able to
function efficiently in the modern world. This includes being able to take decisions
in international bodies of which the 'common state' is a member. In the operation of
the 'common government', the political equality of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots should be respected. Political equality, whilst not requiring numerical
equality, must involve effective participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
in the 'common government', and protection of their fundamental interests.
12. There should be what we have called, for now, two 'component states' -
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot - each with its own 'basic law'. The 'component
states' should be largely self-governing, it being understood that they must not
contravene the 'basic law' of the 'common state'.
They would have power over all matters other than the essential competences
and functions that will be listed in the comprehensive settlement as being the
responsibility of the 'common state'.
Neither 'component state' would be able to interfere in the governance of the
other. It might be possible for the 'component states' to confer additional internal
citizenship rights on persons, who possess Cypriot citizenship.
13. I take it that a comprehensive settlement would commit Cyprus to EU
membership. At the same time, I would hope that the EU would be prepared to
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address special and legitimate concerns in regard to accession. In this context, it is
clearly important that the provisions of the comprehensive settlement should not
represent an obstacle to such membership nor need to be re-negotiated when the
terms of accession are established.
14. Concerning property, we must recognise that there are considerations of
international law to which we must give weight. The solution must withstand legal
challenge. The legal rights which people have to their property must be respected. At
the same time, I believe that a solution should carefully regulate the exercise of these
rights so as to safeguard the character of the 'component states'. Meeting these
principles will require an appropriate combination of reinstatement, exchange and
compensation. For a period of time to be established by agreement, there may be
limits on the number of Greek Cypriots establishing residence in the north and
Turkish Cypriots establishing residence in the south. It is worth mentioning in this
context that the criteria, form and nature of regulation of property rights will also
have a bearing on the extent of territorial adjustment, and vice-versa.
15. I find it hard to imagine a comprehensive settlement without a return to
Greek Cypriot administration of an appreciable amount of territory. In my view, in
negotiating the adjustment, a balance must be struck between a maximum return of
Greek Cypriots to areas being returned to Greek Cypriot administration, and a
minimum of dislocation of Turkish Cypriots. The focus should be on the number of
persons affected more than the amount of territory involved.
Clearly, the moment is approaching where discussions should proceed on the
basis of detailed geographic data.
16. I am confident that arrangements can be made which effectively address
the security concerns of each side. It is clear that one side's security must not be
assured at the expense of the security of the other, and I think that both parties would
be willing to come to an arrangement acceptable to all. Such an arrangement should
include the continuation of the security regime established in 1960, as supplemented
to reflect the comprehensive settlement; the dissolution of Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot forces; a prohibition legally binding on both exporters and importers of arms
supplies; agreed equal levels of Greek and Turkish troops; a United Nations
mandated force and police unit that function throughout the island; and a political
mechanism which can assist in resolving security issues.
17. I am making these observations on the main issues before us after nearly a
year of listening and testing ideas. My purpose is to make a further step in the
direction of developing an overall picture of a comprehensive approach to a
settlement. Please reflect on what I have said. I hope you will use my observations as
the course to follow in the talks ahead.
18. I think it is necessary to schedule further talks early in 2001. Accordingly,
I invite you to continue the proximity talks in Geneva from January 2001. In the
meantime, I am asking Mr de Soto to travel to the region and the island late this
month or early next month.
19. In the time between now and the next session, I would also ask you to
reflect on one final point. A strong impression that I have formed during the
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proximity talks is this: it is not only the sad events of the past that are the tragedy of
modern Cyprus; it is also the absence of a solution. The absence of a solution
prevents all Cypriots from sharing fully - and equally - in the fruits of prosperity,
security and progress. A united and independent Cyprus, in which Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots are equal and protected and free, as citizens of Europe, is the
promise of the future. I hope that you will seize what is perhaps the best chance yet
for a Cyprus settlement, in order to bequeath that promise to succeeding generations.
20. In closing, let me say again that I do not intend to make these remarks
public, and I trust that you will also keep them to yourselves."
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APPENDIX O
The Guidelines Agreed Between President Denktas And The Late Archbishop
Makarios on 12 February 1977
1. We are seeking independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be
discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement,
the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into
consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain
practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the central Federal Government will be such
as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character
of the State.
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APPENDIX P
Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979
1. It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February
1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens
of the Republic.
4. The Talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under
United Nations auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by
the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive
settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented
without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus
problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of
the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both
sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
7. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating
thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any
other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained
manner, avoiding any delay.
10. The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.
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APPENDIX Q
S/RES/774 (1992)
26 August 1992
RESOLUTION 774 (1992)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3109th meeting, on 26 August 1992
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 on
his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/24472),
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Cyprus,
Noting that some progress has been achieved, in particular the acceptance by
both sides of the right of return and the right to property, and in a narrowing of the
gap by both sides on territorial adjustments,
Expressing concern nevertheless that it has not yet been possible, for reasons
explained in the report, to achieve the goals set out in resolution 750 (1992),
1. Endorses the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his
efforts;
2. Reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of
Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and
comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the
Secretary-General's report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal
federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with
any other country or any form of partition or secession;
3. Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments
reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report as the
basis for reaching an overall framework agreement;
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4. Agrees with the Secretary-General that the Set of Ideas as an integrated
whole has not been sufficiently developed to enable the two sides to reach an overall
agreement;
5. Calls on the parties to manifest the necessary political will and to address
in a positive manner the observations of the Secretary-General for resolving the
issues covered in his report;
6. Urges the parties, when they resume their face-to-face talks with the
Secretary-General on 26 October 1992, to pursue uninterrupted negotiations at
United Nations Headquarters until an overall framework agreement is reached on the
basis of the entire Set of Ideas;
7. Reaffirms its position that the Secretary-General convene, following the
satisfactory conclusion of the face-to-face talks, a high-level international meeting
chaired by him to conclude an overall framework agreement, in which the two
communities and Greece and Turkey would participate;
8. Requests all concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and
his representatives in preparing the ground prior to the resumption of the direct talks
in October to facilitate the speedy completion of the work;
9. Expresses the expectation that an overall framework agreement will be
concluded in 1992 and that 1993 will be the transitional period during which the
measures set out in the annex to the Set of Ideas will be implemented;
10. Reaffirms that, in line with previous resolutions of the Security Council,
the present status quo is not acceptable, and, should an agreement not emerge from
the talks that will reconvene in October, calls on the Secretary-General to identify the
reasons for the failure and to recommend to the Council alternative courses of action
to resolve the Cyprus problem;
11. Request the Secretary-General to submit, prior to the end of 1992, a full
report on the talks that will resume in October.
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APPENDIX R
The European Commission Opinion on the Application by the
Republic of Cyprus for Membership
Extracts
doc/93/5 - June 30, 1993
Foreword
On 3 July 1990, the government of the Republic of Cyprus submitted to the
Council of the European Communities an application for membership of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC).
At its meeting on 17 September 1990, the Council noted the application and
decided to set in motion the procedures laid down in Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty,
Article 237 of the EEC Treaty and Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty, asking the
Commission to draw up an opinion, as required by these provisions.
Applications have recently also been received from several EFTA countries
and from Malta, and an application was previously submitted by Turkey. The
Commission delivered its opinion on Turkey's application in December 1989,
followed by opinions on the applications of Austria  (August 1991), Sweden (July
1992), Finland (November 1992) and Norway (March 1993). It is transmitting its
opinion on the application submitted by Malta simultaneously with this document.
The European Council concluded its discussion of the question of
enlargement at its Lisbon meeting on 26 and 27 June 1992 with the following
observations relating to the EFTA countries:
"The European Council considers that the EEA Agreement has paved the way
for opening enlargement negotiations with a view to an early conclusion with EFTA
countries seeking membership of the European Union … The official negotiations
will be opened immediately after the Treaty on European Union is ratified and
agreement has been achieved on the Delors II package."
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In the light of the decisions taken by the European Council at its Edinburgh
meeting on 11 and 12 December 1992, enlargement negotiations got under way in
February 1993 with Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in April 1993 with Norway.
As regards applications from other countries, the Lisbon conclusions continue as
follows:
"… The European Council considers that if the challenges of a European
Union composed of a larger number of Member States are to be met successfully,
parallel progress is needed as regards the internal development of the Union and in
preparation for membership of other countries.
In this context the European Council discussed the applications which have
been submitted by Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. The European Council agrees that
each of these applications must be considered on its merits.
Relations with Cyprus and Malta will be developed and strengthened by
building on the Association Agreements and their application for membership and by
developing the political dialogue."
The European Council which met in Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993
"considered that its guidelines with regard to enlargement with the EFTA countries
shall be without prejudice to the situation of other countries which have applied to
join the Union. The Union will consider each of these membership applications on its
own merits.
The European Council welcomed the Commission's intention to present
shortly its opinion on Malta and on Cyprus. These opinions will be examined rapidly
by the Council taking into consideration the particular situation of each of the two
countries".
Conclusions
Cyprus's geographical position, the deep-lying bonds which, for two thousand
years, have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilization,
the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of
Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, economic and social life of its
citizens, the wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer
on Cyprus, beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its
vocation to belong to the Community.
A political settlement of the Cyprus question would serve only to reinforce
this vocation and strengthen the ties which link Cyprus to Europe. At the same time,
a settlement would open the way to the full restoration of human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout the island and encourage the development of
pluralist democracy.
The Commission is convinced that the result of Cyprus's accession to the
Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring
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the two communities on the island closer together. If there were to be a political
settlement, the prospect of the progressive re-establishment of fundamental liberties
would help overcome the inevitable practical difficulties which would arise during
the transition period in regard to the adoption of the relevant Community legislation.
In regard to economic aspects, this opinion has shown that, in view of the progress
towards a customs union achieved thus far, the adoption of the acquis
communautaire by Cyprus will pose no insurmountable problems. The Commission
is not underestimating the problems that the economic transition poses. However, the
economy of the southern part of the island has demonstrated an ability to adapt and
seems ready to face the challenge of integration provided that the work already
started on reforms and on opening up to the outside world is maintained, notably in
the context of the customs union. This opinion also has also shown that there will be
a greater chance of narrowing the development gap between north and south in event
of Cyprus's integration with the Community.
The government of the Republic of Cyprus shares this conviction. Even
though they object to the conditions under which the application for membership was
made, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community are fully conscious of the
economic and social benefits that integration with Europe would bring their
community.
This opinion has also shown that Cyprus's integration with the Community
implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question - a
settlement which will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for
confidence to be re-established and for their respective leaders to work together.
While safeguarding the essential balance between the two communities and the right
of each to preserve its fundamental interests, the institutional provisions contained in
such a settlement should create the appropriate conditions for Cyprus to participate
normally in the decision-making process of the European Community and in the
correct application of Community law throughout the island.
In view of all the above and in the expectation of significant progress in the
talks currently being pursued under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, the Commission feels that a positive signal should be sent to the
authorities and the people of Cyprus confirming that the Community considers
Cyprus as eligible for membership and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is
surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually
lead to its accession.
The United Nations Secretary-General is aware that he can count on the
Community's support in his continued endeavours to produce a political settlement of
the Cyprus question.
Even before such a settlement is forthcoming, the Commission undertakes to
use all the instruments available under the Association Agreement to contribute, in
close cooperation with the Cypriot government, to the economic, social and political
transition of Cyprus towards integration with the Community.
If the Council agrees, and in the hope of facilitating the conduct of the future
accession negotiations, the Commission is willing to begin immediately talks with
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the government of Cyprus. These talks would serve to familiarize the Cypriot
authorities with all the elements that constitute the acquis communautaire, partly in
order to allow them to prepare their negotiating position under the best possible
conditions and partly to permit an assessment of the need for any technical
cooperation and assistance that their country might require to adopt and implement
Community legislation and the policies and instruments that will be needed for its
integration and to prepare the way, in due course, for the north of the island to catch
up economically.
The Commission also undertakes to examine the issue of Cyprus's future
institutions and their compatibility with the requirements of active participation in
the day-to-day running of the Community in the event of accession.
The Community must ensure, moreover, that the general assessment to be
carried out in the context of the 1996 inter-governmental conference results in
greater efficiency in the operation of the institutions of an enlarged Community - and
one that could well be enlarged further - while at the same time providing Cyprus,
and any other new Member state of a similar size, with a guarantee that it will
receive appropriate treatment in the decision-making process and in the discharging
of its responsibilities.
Lastly, the Commission must envisage the possibility of the failure of the
inter-communal talks to produce a political settlement of the Cyprus question in the
foreseeable future, in spite of the endeavours of the United Nations Secretary-
General. Should this eventuality arise, the Commission feels that the situation should
be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks and that the
question of Cyprus's accession to the Community should be reconsidered in January
1995.
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APPENDIX S
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL
10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS (Provisions Concerning CYPRUS)
9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the
process to a successful conclusion.
     (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been
reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on
accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council
will take account of all relevant factors.
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APPENDIX T
SUMMARY OF THE OPINION OF PROFESSOR M. H. MENDELSON QC
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO JOIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 3 JUNE 1997
1. After World War II, the British Government was in favour of giving
independence to the colony of Cyprus. However, there was a strong movement
within the Greek Cypriot community favouring unification with Greece (enosis),
which greatly alarmed the Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, in 1959 the Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers reached an agreement in Zurich which laid the
foundations for a solution. They agreed on a Basic Structure, which was to form
the basis of the constitution of an independent "Republic of Cyprus" draft Treaty
of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK; and a
draft Treaty of Alliance between the first three states. The two communities in
Cyprus accepted this formula. At the meeting held at the Foreign Office on 12
February 1959 with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, the Foreign
Secretary sought clarification of various matters; he also insisted - and his
counterparts agreed - that the UK would be entitled to retain military bases on the
island, and that this would be guaranteed, not just by the Republic of Cyprus, but
the two other States. This package was endorsed (with some elaboration) by all
parties, including representatives of the two communities, and a commission was
set up to elaborate a Constitution. This contained certain unamendable Basic
Articles designed, in particular, to maintain the carefully engineered system of
checks and balances which, amongst other things, entrenched the equal
partnership rights of the Turkish community. On 16.8.1960 the "Republic of
Cyprus" became independent, the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and
Establishment being signed at the same time. The cornerstone of the settlement in
Cyprus was and remains the Treaty of Guarantee, which with its related
instruments, was designed to secure the independence of the island, a balance
between the interests of the two communities and also between those of the two
States with which those communities have ethnic ties, and  - last but not least - a
legal foundation for the retention by the UK of its sovereign bases and other
facilities.
2. The Opinion considers whether there are any convincing grounds for impugning
either the initial validity or the continuance in force of the relevant provisions of
the Treaty, and concludes that there are not. The Guarantors - the United
Kingdom, Turkey and  - it seems - Greece indeed continue to recognise its
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3. validity, which is also the position of the UN Security Council. Indeed, it would
be difficult for these States not to accept the continuing validity of the Treaty,
which provides the justification for their involvement in the affairs of Cyprus
and, in the case of the UK, its retention of the sovereign base areas.
4. Turning to the substance, by Article I (2) of the Treaty of Guarantee, the
"Republic of Cyprus undertook "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any
political or economic union with any State whatsoever". Membership of the EU
would constitute participation in whole or in part in an economic union, and at
least in part in a political union. The conclusion must be, therefore, that this
would be contrary to the Treaty. To try and escape this conclusion by arguing
that the Treaty prohibits only union with a State, not States in the plural, would
not only do violence to the ordinary meaning of the words, their context and their
objective and purpose: it would also run counter to the express intentions of the
Governments who drafted this provision. For, as the Opinion shows, they
specifically considered membership of international economic and political
organisations in the context of the provision of the Treaty. By definition, such
organisations would comprise other States, in the plural. The drafters were only
prepared to relax this ban if the organisation was one in which both Greece and
Turkey both participated: but such is not the case with the EU. Furthermore,
Article I (2) goes on to prohibit, not just participation (in whole or in part) in an
economic or political union, but even "all activity likely to promote, directly or
indirectly…union with any other State". It can not be gainsaid that membership
of Cyprus in the EU is likely to promote directly or indirectly, union with other
States, and most particularly with Greece.
5. Nor was this the only undertaking of Cyprus. By paragraph (1) of the same
Article it also "undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence,
territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution". And the
Constitution thus guaranteed most-favoured-nation treatment to each of the
Guarantors whereas, manifestly, if Cyprus became a member of the EU, Greece
and the UK would have necessarily to receive more favoured treatment than
Turkey. Moreover, Article 50 of the Constitution expressly gave the Turkish
Vice-President, as the representative of his community, a veto over Cyprus'
membership in any international organisation unless both Greece and Turkey
were members. These were amongst the select group of unamendable "Basic
Articles" in the Constitution which the Republic of Cyprus undertook in the
Treaty of Guarantee to respect. For all the above reasons it seems clear that
Nicosia would violate its treaty obligations by seeking or accepting membership
in the EU.
6. For their part, the Guarantor States also undertook important legal obligations.
By Article II (1) of the same Treaty, these three States took "note of the
undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus in Article 1" and "recognise[d] and
guarantee[d]", inter alia, the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of
the Constitution. Furthermore, in paragraph (2), reflecting the corresponding
undertaking by the Republic of Cyprus in Article I (2), they "likewise
undert[ook] to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting,
directly or indirectly,…union of Cyprus with any other State…". Admittedly, this
guarantee is not completely unqualified it extends only" so far as concerns them"
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or, as the original version had it, "so far as lies within their power". But it
certainly does lie within the power of the UK (and, indeed, of Greece) to prevent
a violation of the Treaty by the simple exercise of their veto.
7. Furthermore, given that at least de facto the writ of Nicosia does not run
throughout Cyprus, if that country were to join the EU there would be
considerable practical and legal obstacles in the way of Nicosia's implementation
of duties which would have to be undertaken towards other members in respect
of the island as a whole. For their part, the other members would find it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their legal obligations in
respect of Cyprus as a whole. As the Opinion shows, the EU Commission and
Court, as well as the UK Government, have frankly recognised these difficulties,
but the Commission failed to draw the appropriate conclusions when it declared
Nicosia's application (on behalf of the whole island) admissible.
8. The undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus and of the three Guarantor States are
not mere political statements. They are solemn legal promises embodied in a
formal treaty. And what is given by this particular treaty is a guarantee, the most
solemn form of pledge known to law. All four of the states concerned obtained
benefits under the Treaty of Guarantee, but with these benefits came obligations.
International law, by which the United Kingdom and other members of the EU
set great store, demands that these obligations be performed.
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